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Executive Summary
Japan is a vibrant democracy, but its citizens have never been given, nor
have they ever taken, full responsibility for authoring their own constitu-
tion—until now, that is. By the late 1990s, public opinion had shifted. A
majority favor changing their constitution. And today both the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the main opposition party, the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), are preparing drafts for its revision.
Japan is in the midst of one of the most consequential tests of its demo-
cratic institutions.
Although the contemporary revision debate encompasses such
weighty issues as the role of the emperor, description of Japanese national
character, reorganization of local government, separation of powers, and
basic rights of citizens, one passage in particular continues to cast a shad-
ow over the entire enterprise: Article Nine, the famous “peace clause”
renouncing the possession and use of force for settling international dis-
putes. Long the primary target of revisionist fervor, Article Nine was at the
center of the first serious revision debate in the 1950s and controversies
arising from its application helped to ignite the contemporary revision
movement after the Gulf War in 1991.
There are many reasons why revision proponents have sought to
change Article Nine. For some it is an impediment to the realization of
national autonomy. The postwar constitution was drafted under the U.S.
occupation, and Article Nine, whatever its exact origins, was one of three
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nonnegotiable demands imposed on the Japanese by General Douglas
MacArthur. It is thus no surprise that revisionists often qualify Article
Nine with the adjective “U.S.-imposed.” For others the peace clause is an
impediment to national muscularity. As we shall see, interpretations of the
article’s sweeping language have placed constraints on Japan’s military and
its ability to use force in foreign affairs. At times these constraints have
complicated Japan’s relationship with its only alliance partner, the United
States, as well as efforts to increase Japanese influence in the United
Nations. Finally, some favor revision because they see Article Nine as an
impediment to national honesty. Following major reinterpretations in the
early 1950s, Article Nine has been endlessly parsed in ways both large and
small as the domestic and international political landscapes have shifted.
As a result, it may be argued, Japanese security policy no longer reflects a
strict interpretation of the peace clause, and the constitution should thus
be brought into line with reality.
These arguments are not new. Revision proponents have advanced var-
ious versions since the 1950s. This raises two important questions. First,
why has Article Nine survived so long without amendment? Second, why
has the Article Nine issue returned to the political agenda with such force
in recent years? More specifically: why does the LDP finally seem to have
congealed on the issue, and why has the major opposition party joined in
calling for constitutional revision? To address these questions, we examine
evidence from the two strongest revisionist movements in postwar Japanese
history: the immediate postwar period (1947–64) and the post-Cold War
period (1990–present). Based on these cases, we locate the primary source
of Article Nine’s longevity in domestic politics. Specifically, Article Nine
has found critical support from a diverse coalition driven by two very dif-
ferent motivations, pragmatism, and pacifism. Pragmatism refers to a par-
ticular set of beliefs used to calculate the postwar national interest in
exceedingly practical (cost/benefit) terms. Applying these beliefs to the
conditions facing Japan, pragmatists generated and maintained the postwar
strategy of reliance on the United States to guarantee Japan’s security.
Pacifism, by contrast, refers to adherence to the doctrine of nonviolence.
This belief spread as part of an identity movement that redefined postwar
Japan as a “peace nation” (heiwa kokka). The policy implications of this
redefinition were exemplified in a preference for “unarmed neutrality.”
Although the relative strength of these two forces has varied over the
years, each in its own right has been a formidable obstacle to significant
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change in Article Nine. Despite this long track record—and although revi-
sion is by no means a foregone conclusion—the tripartite political dynam-
ic among pacifists, pragmatists, and those who sought to revise Article
Nine has recently shifted in ways that make amendment far more likely
than ever before. There has been a tremendous rise in revisionist sentiment
in the political parties, the Diet, and the public. And, the pragmatist/paci-
fist coalition has been greatly weakened. We trace the rise of revisionism
primarily to three factors: the failure of leftist parties to redefine them-
selves in a shifted political landscape; national and party-level institution-
al reforms that have strengthened the role of the prime minister within the
LDP and in the policymaking process; and the leadership of the current
prime minister, Koizumi Junichir-o. In short, changes in partisanship,
institutions, and leadership have been critical drivers behind the rise of
revisionism over the last decade. International development since the early
1990s provided the revisionists with further opportunities to challenge the
constitutional status quo. The rise of revisionism has enabled the Japanese
government to undertake certain major policy changes as, for example, in
the overseas dispatch of troops and in its Iraq policy, which is clearly a
major turning point in Japan’s postwar security policy. 
Despite the rise in revisionist sentiment, revision of Article Nine still
faces serious challenges including the failure to reach consensus among
conservatives and within the LDP on many central issues relating to
Article Nine, the presence of K-omeit-o in the coalition government, the
politics of the main opposition party DPJ, and public opinion which is
still deeply divided over collective self-defense. Consequently, the present
Article Nine debate could have several possible outcomes: formalization of
the informal status quo; major parties reaching an agreement on allowing
a restricted form of collective self-defense; formal recognition of the right
to collective self-defense without any restriction (least likely); and finally
the possibility of complete failure. The study then briefly explores the like-
ly implications of constitutional revision of the right to collective self-
defense for Japanese politics, U.S.-Japan security relations, and for Japan’s
regional relations. In conclusion the study argues that the debate over
Article Nine has shifted in ways that makes major constitutional change
possible although it neither sets the future course of change nor guarantees
its occurrence. Whatever the outcome, the debate will be an important,
and hopefully, affirmative experience in Japanese democracy.  
x J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels
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Nine Lives?:
The Politics of Constitutional
Reform in Japan
November 2005 is the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the most
powerful institution in postwar Japanese politics, the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP). The LDP plans to mark the occasion with a party first: the
release of a detailed proposal for revising Japan’s constitution. Although
constitutional revision has been a formal plank of the LDP platform since
its establishment in 1955, and although party committees have generated
recommendations for changing the constitution over the years, the LDP
has never before offered the Japanese public a revision proposal with full
party backing. Meanwhile the leading opposition party, the Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ), is also developing a constitutional revision propos-
al. When one considers that the postwar constitution has never been
amended, the historical import of these developments is irrefutable. This
movement among the country’s leading parties comes on the heels of near-
ly a decade of public opinion surveys showing that a majority of Japanese
favor changing their constitution. Considering these recent developments,
Watanabe Osamu, a Hitotsubashi University professor who closely follows
constitutional politics, declares: “Constitutional revision has now been
placed on the political calendar for the first time in the postwar era.”1
Although the contemporary revision debate encompasses such
weighty issues as the role of the emperor, the reorganization of local gov-
ernment, the separation of powers, and the basic rights of citizens, one
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passage in particular continues to cast a shadow over the entire enterprise:
Article Nine, the famous “peace clause” renouncing the possession and use
of force for settling international disputes. Long the primary target of revi-
sionist fervor, Article Nine was at the center of the first serious revision
debate in the 1950s and controversies arising from its application helped
to ignite the contemporary revision movement in the 1990s.
There are many reasons why revision proponents have long sought to
change Article Nine. For some it is an impediment to the realization of
national autonomy. The postwar constitution was drafted under the U.S.
occupation, and Article Nine, whatever its exact origins, was one of three
nonnegotiable demands imposed on the Japanese by General Douglas
MacArthur. It is thus no surprise that revisionists often qualify Article
Nine with the adjective “U.S.-imposed.” For others the peace clause is an
impediment to national muscularity. As we shall
see, interpretations of the article’s sweeping lan-
guage have placed constraints on Japan’s military
and its ability to use force in foreign affairs. At
times these constraints have complicated Japan’s
relationship with its only alliance partner, the
United States, as well as efforts to increase
Japanese influence in the United Nations. Finally, some favor revision
because they see Article Nine as an impediment to national honesty.
Following major reinterpretations in the early 1950s, Article Nine has
been endlessly parsed in ways both large and small as the domestic and
international political landscapes have shifted. As a result, it may be
argued, Japanese security policy no longer reflects a strict interpretation of
the peace clause, and the constitution should thus be brought into line
with reality.
These arguments are not new. Revision proponents have advanced
various versions since the 1950s. This raises two important questions.
First, why has Article Nine survived so long without amendment?
Second, why has the Article Nine issue returned to the political agenda
with such force in recent years? More specifically: why does the LDP
finally seem to have congealed on the issue, and why has the major oppo-
sition party joined in calling for constitutional revision? To address these
questions, we examine evidence from the two strongest revisionist move-
ments in postwar Japanese history: the immediate postwar period
(1947–64) and the post-Cold War period (1990–present).2 Based on
There are many reasons
why revision proponents
have long sought to
change Article Nine 
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these cases, we locate the primary source of Article Nine’s longevity in
domestic politics. Specifically, Article Nine has found critical support
from a diverse coalition driven by two very different motivations, prag-
matism and pacifism. Pragmatism refers to a particular set of beliefs used
to calculate the postwar national interest in exceedingly practical
(cost/benefit) terms. Applying these beliefs to the conditions facing Japan,
pragmatists generated and maintained the postwar strategy of reliance on
the United States to guarantee Japan’s security. Pacifism, by contrast,
refers to adherence to the doctrine of nonviolence. This belief spread as
part of an identity movement that redefined postwar Japan as a “peace
nation” (heiwa kokka). The policy implications of this redefinition were
exemplified in a preference for “unarmed neutrality.”
Acknowledging diverse sources of support opens the door to a better
understanding of the politics of Article Nine. Focused on expanding
domestic economic capacity through traditional programs of state-led
development, pragmatists quickly realized the value of Article Nine as a
tool for managing Japan’s military alliance with the United States.
Invoking the article repeatedly in security negotiations during the 1950s,
pragmatists such as Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru were able to deflect
escalating U.S. demands for increased Japanese alliance contributions.
And domestically they were able to leverage their support for Article Nine
to attract allies on the left during crucial policy fights. As a consequence,
the conservative majority in the Diet split into opposing camps of prag-
matists (who supported rearmament with constraints and extreme reliance
on the U.S. security guarantee) versus revisionists (who favored uncon-
strained rearmament and a greater degree of security independence). It is
this division––not between right and left but within the right itself––that
protected Article Nine in the years prior to pacifism’s rise as an organized
political force. In later years, this division made possible cooperation
between pragmatic conservatives and pacifistic progressives in support of
Article Nine’s institutionalization. On numerous occasions, Article Nine
found vital support both from pragmatists seeking to protect interests
threatened under the U.S.-Japan alliance and from subscribers to a paci-
fistic identity categorically opposed to the organized use of violence.
Although the relative strength of these two forces has varied over the years,
each in its own right has been a formidable obstacle to significant change
in Article Nine. Despite this long track record––and although revision is
by no means a foregone conclusion––the tripartite political dynamic
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among pacifists, pragmatists, and those who sought to revise Article Nine
has recently shifted in ways that make amendment far more likely than
ever before. This essay seeks to explain these changes as well as their like-
ly implications for Japan’s domestic and international politics.
Before proceeding, however, a few caveats are in order. First, it is not
our intention here to develop a comprehensive explanation of all the var-
ied currents of Japan’s postwar security policy. We seek to shed light on the
Article Nine debate and address wider issues only to the extent they pro-
vide the necessary context for our examination of the constitutional issue.
Second, although we advance what is essentially a domestic politics expla-
nation, we do not deny the importance of the international environment
in the outcomes we observe. International factors, such as the end of the
Cold War, the rise of the Chinese economy, and the presence or absence
of significant U.S. pressure, certainly influenced the positions of the
domestic groups we examine. Our argument is not that these factors have
been irrelevant to the Article Nine debate; rather, we simply contend that
they have not been determinative.
Shifts in the international system have not led to shifts in Japanese
security policy in any direct way. Different domestic groups have looked
at the international environment and come to very different conclusions
regarding the utility of Article Nine for the nation’s security. That the win-
ning coalitions emerging from these differences have so far supported
Article Nine’s retention is thus partly the result of international factors,
but this outcome has often been at odds with the predictions of theories
stressing the primacy of “third image” considera-
tions. And although international factors have
certainly contributed to recent changes in the
Article Nine debate, we locate the primary driv-
ers of this process in domestic politics. This does
not mean that external events are incapable of
figuring decisively in the constitutional debate in
the years to come. Nor, as we shall see, does it
preclude these actors from using shifts in region-
al and world politics to bolster their case for
change or stasis. Indeed, we consider several such scenarios when address-
ing the prospects for future change. We focus, though, on domestic poli-
tics because in our view no explanation of Article Nine’s past, nor any
assessment of its future, is complete without reference to the ideological
no explanation of
Article Nine’s past, nor
any assessment of its
future, is complete with-
out reference to [domes-
tic politics]
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differences, factional divisions, institutional arrangements, and leadership
that have maintained the clause at the center of Japan’s security policy for
nearly sixty years.
Interpreting Article Nine
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling interna-
tional disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
Understanding the nearly theological difficulties associated with interpret-
ing these two paragraphs requires stepping back and considering both
Article Nine’s origins and the institutional context within which it has
been contested.
Article Nine is a political manifesto, a declaration of general principle
constraining state action. In this sense, it is similar to the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution—only, instead of limiting state
power vis-à-vis the citizenry, it curtails state power vis-à-vis other countries
by specifying the orientation of the Japanese state
in world affairs. Although the language seems
unambiguous, the exact boundaries of this prin-
ciple have been the subject of continuing debate,
beginning with the article’s very origins. One
widely accepted view traces its origins to General
Douglas MacArthur and his staff in the Government Section (GS) of the
General Headquarters of the U.S. occupation forces (McNelly 1987:
79–80). A second view holds that the concept (and perhaps the text) was
suggested to the general by Prime Minister Shidehara Kij-ur-o during a
meeting in January 1946.3
A problem thus emerges in determining original intent. Following ini-
tial internal disagreements, MacArthur and the GS officers responsible for
drafting Article Nine reached a common understanding regarding the
principle it enshrined: nonaggression.4 In other words, aggressive war and
Article Nine is a politi-
cal manifesto…con-
straining state action 
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the possession of armaments for that purpose were renounced, but Japan
retained the right to possess and exercise military capabilities necessary to
preserve its existence as a sovereign nation.5 Accordingly, “war potential”
could be maintained for both self-defense and collective self-defense obli-
gations. Shidehara’s understanding of the principle, however, held that the
text mandated a doctrine of state nonviolence. In policy terms, Article Nine
forbade participation in any type of war, aggressive or defensive, as well as
the maintenance of any type of military capabilities whatsoever. Although
advocating that Japan entrust its security to international society,
Shidehara argued that this principle precluded Japanese participation in
collective self-defense arrangements since it banned the military capabili-
ties required to meet such obligations (Schlichtmann 1995: 51–53). For
most of the postwar period, interpretations have bounced between these
established poles of nonaggression and nonviolence.
Article Nine is embedded in an institutional context that has greatly
affected debates over its interpretation. Although the constitution explic-
itly grants the right of judicial review to Japanese courts, the judiciary has
played a relatively small role in the Article Nine debate. In cases brought
by plaintiffs charging the government with violating Article Nine, judges
have seldom ruled in their favor. Instead, final judgments have not only
tended to support the government’s position but have also limited judicial
authority vis-à-vis the other branches of government.6 Judicial passivity in
Article Nine cases remains the norm to the present day.
Due to this limited judicial role, Article Nine’s institutionalization has
been driven by executive and legislative action. During the long years of
LDP dominance in the Diet, the de facto power to interpret Article Nine
lay in the hands of cabinet politicians and an extraordinary group of
bureaucrats––the legal scholars in the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB).
The baseline for the continuously parsed interpretations began with the
CLB’s 1952 definition of “war potential” (senryoku). Ordered by Prime
Minister Yoshida Shigeru, this interpretation stated that Article Nine did
not ban military capabilities falling short of the ability to conduct “mod-
ern warfare” nor the use of such capabilities to repel a direct attack
(Nakamura 2001: 99). Now the use of force banned in the second para-
graph was related only to the purposes of the first paragraph, which no
longer proscribed self-defense. In its first formal interpretation of Article
Nine, the CLB declared:
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[War potential (senryoku)] refers to a force with the equipment and
organization capable of conducting modern warfare. . . . Determining
what constitutes war potential requires a concrete judgment taking
into account the temporal and spatial environment of the country in
question. . . . It is neither unconstitutional to maintain capabilities
that fall short of war potential nor to utilize these capabilities to defend
the nation from direct invasion. [Nakamura 2001: 99]
The director-general of the National Safety Agency, Kimura Tokutar-o,
exasperated with persistent questioning in the Diet about what constituted
“war potential,” finally admitted that there were “no clear quantitative
measures” and appealed to “the people’s common sense” (Nakamura 2001:
104). War potential, he and the CLB maintained, was definable only in
relation to other states’ capabilities and international conditions. It was, in
effect, measurable only on a sliding scale. One man’s sliding scale is anoth-
er man’s slippery slope.
Although this “modern warfare” standard was the subject of continu-
ing disagreement within the CLB and would soon be revised, the assertion
that such a standard existed at all was a significant innovation.7 Moreover,
the interpretation specified for the first time that Japan could use force to
defend itself from attack. This was a major shift since, until the Korean
War, Prime Minister Yoshida had insisted that Japan did not even have the
right of self-defense under the constitution. Even after the war started,
Yoshida’s government had denied that the 75,000-man National Police
Reserves (NPR) was responsible for external security.
Armed with this interpretation, Yoshida wielded it as a shield against
U.S. demands for extensive rearmament and as a wedge to split his domes-
tic opponents seeking to abolish Article Nine’s constraints. As the Cold
War progressed and U.S. demands on its Japanese partner intensified,
Yoshida took full advantage of his new flexibility. By 1954, he had utilized
the ambiguities of “modern warfare” to establish the Self-Defense Force
(SDF)—a land, sea, and air force explicitly assigned the task of defending
the country from external threats—without amending Article Nine.8
Following Yoshida’s fall from power in December 1954, the CLB
quickly persuaded the new Hatoyama government to accept an even more
flexible interpretation. In this new version, the “war potential” forbidden
by Article Nine was any military capability in excess of the “minimum
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necessary level” required to protect Japan’s sovereignty from direct attacks.
The new interpretation specified the conditions under which Japan could
exercise self-defense: when it is facing an imminent and illegitimate act of
aggression; when there is no other means of countering this act; and when
the use of force in self-defense is limited to the minimum necessary level
(jiei no tame no hitsuy -o no jitsuryoku).9 Self-defense is thus narrowly under-
stood as only the defense of national territory (Nakamura 2001: 147).
This 1954 interpretation imposed two major constraints on subse-
quent Japanese security policy––or seemed to. First, it limited force levels
to those sufficient to provide self-defense narrowly defined; second, it
limited the use of force to self-defense. The proscription of aggressive war
meant that Japan could not maintain the capability to conduct “modern
warfare.” Nor could it assist allied nations under attack. Although there
have been a great many other twists and turns in
subsequent years, there is a bottom line here: the
battle for control over the definition of what
constitutes “minimum necessary force” persists
to this day. Political disputes over “necessary lim-
its” (hitsuy -o na gendo) gave way to arguments
over the “necessary proper sphere” (hitsuy -o s -ot -o
na hani) and then “necessary minimum limit”
(hitsuy -o saisho gendo). And what is “minimum”
or “necessary” in a combat situation? Hairs have been split over whether
“armed force” (buryoku) is different from “war potential” (senryoku),
which is clearly banned by Article Nine. Each term carries with it the
weight of endlessly parsed legal interpretations. In 1968, the CLB reaf-
firmed that the SDF can only act “when there is a sudden unprovoked
attack on Japan and there are no other means available to protect the lives
and safety of the people.”10
The continuous hairsplitting makes for contested politics and messy
policy. Until very recently, the extant interpretation allowed an SDF offi-
cer to take any action he deems necessary to protect Japanese lives and
property, but it also required him to have the approval of the prime min-
ister. And, of course, actions of the Japanese prime minister required
approval by the cabinet. And because the cabinet operates on a consensus
basis, all ministers had to agree. Since the cabinet meets only twice a week,
it was hard to imagine a timely authorization for a Japanese soldier who
finds himself under fire.
the battle for control
over the definition
of…“minimum neces-
sary force” persists to
this day 
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Former Prime Minister Nakasone is only one of many prominent
politicians who have criticized the impracticality of CLB interpretations.
After the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, he
expressed his dissatisfaction with “the extreme vagueness of the term ‘nec-
essary minimum’ [which] has led to very fragile constitutional interpreta-
tions and to groundless practical applications.”11 In the 2001
Antiterrorism Law, some restrictions were lifted. Now a Japanese soldier
under fire has to first shout a warning. Then he has to fire in the air. Then
he must fire into the ground. Then he is permitted to fire at a nonvital
body part. These changes have made the interpretation more practi-
cal––after a fashion.
But perhaps the toughest problem has been the 1954 interpretation’s
implications for collective self-defense—namely, that it is unconstitution-
al.12 This problem has driven conservative politicians mad and animated
the current drive for constitutional revision. In 1951, the vice-minister of
foreign affairs told occupation authorities that Japan could support U.S.
troops if they were attacked on Okinawa, which was then not even
Japanese territory.13 After the 1954 interpretation and until the 1980s,
however, the CLB interpreted the ban so narrowly that the SDF would not
have been allowed to assist a U.S. warship that came under attack while
defending Japan. In 1972, a senior CLB official explained to an upper
house committee that Japan could not defend an allied country unless
Japan itself was attacked. 
In May 1981, the CLB issued a formal interpretation of the relation-
ship between international law, collective self-defense, and Article Nine.
This interpretation, which recognizes that Japan has the right of collective
self-defense under international law but is forbidden to exercise it under
Article Nine, has since been the focus of revisionists’ ire. Since collective
self-defense has become the centerpiece of the contemporary debate over
Article Nine, this interpretation is worth quoting in full:
It is recognized under international law that a state has the right of
collective self-defense, which is the right to use actual force to stop an
armed attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations,
even when the state itself is not under direct attack. It is therefore
self-evident that since it is a sovereign state, Japan has the right of col-
lective self-defense under international law. The Japanese govern-
ment nevertheless takes the view that the exercise of the right of self-
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defense as authorized under Article Nine of the Constitution is con-
fined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country.
The government believes that the exercise of the right of collective
self-defense exceeds that limit and is not, therefore, permissible under
the Constitution.14
When SDF troops were dispatched to Iraq in early 2004, Prime Minister
Koizumi and Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director-General Ishiba took
pains to inform other members of America’s “coalition of the willing” that
Japanese troops would not come to their defense if they were attacked.
One can only imagine the damage that would be done to the coalition if
such a situation were to occur. Even in the absence of a major incident,
Dutch forces have complained about having to defend their Japanese
neighbors in Samawah. When the Dutch announced their withdrawal
from Iraq after twenty months of service, Koizumi asked Australian Prime
Minister John Howard to send forces to take their place. Although the
Howard government decided to comply, the move proved very unpopular
with the Australian public.15
Why, then, has Article Nine never been revised? The simple answer is
not wrong in this case: Article Ninety-Six of the constitution mandates
that revision requires a two-thirds supermajority in both houses of the
Diet and a simple majority in a national referendum. Conservatives have
long complained that this bar is too high, and schemes to lower these
requirements are virtually a permanent fixture within the revision move-
ment. Indeed, the spring 2005 LDP draft included language that would
reduce the requirement for a two-thirds supermajority to a simple major-
ity of 50 percent plus one vote. Still, according to one study, Japan’s
amendment procedure is rated eighth out of 32 constitutional systems in
level of difficulty, placing it in the same category as the United States (Lutz
1994: 360–62).
With the exception of Japan, however, all other countries with similar
amendment procedures have revised their constitutions. Thus institutional
difficulty may be a factor in Article Nine’s longevity, but it cannot be the
whole story. In fact, the more complicated answer is also the more inter-
esting one. What is it about the dynamics of Japanese politics that, despite
more than half a century of talk about revision, the renunciation of force
to settle international disputes remains unchanged at the center of Japanese
security policy? Is this because the Japanese have become recalcitrant paci-
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fists intimidated by the ghosts of their militarist past? Is it because the left
has constrained the choice of the right? Is it because Japanese national iden-
tity was transformed from “Big Japanism” to “Small Japanism” and from
imperial and aggressive to mercantile and passive? These labels are all, of
course, components of the conventional wisdom––and while each gets at
part of the story, there remains much to unbundle.
Explaining Persistence and Change
Why has Article Nine survived unchanged for decades only to be chal-
lenged so aggressively in recent years? This section considers four possi-
ble explanations: realism, generational change, nonmajoritarianism, and
antimilitarism.
Realism
Realist theories of international politics provide two possible explanations
based on the ever-changing balance of power in East Asia. The first, most
notably offered by Herman Kahn over three decades ago, argued that
Japan, after having enhanced its power position through nearly two
decades of high-speed economic growth, would seek “full superpower sta-
tus,” including a nuclear arsenal, in order to pursue its expanded eco-
nomic interests on a global scale (1970: 153). Although Japan certainly
expanded the roles and capabilities of its military in the years following
this prediction, it has so far done so within the framework of Article Nine
interpretations, all the while sticking closely to its alliance partner, the
United States, and eschewing the acquisition of nuclear weapons.16
Applied to explain the rise of revisionism in recent years, this realist view
points to the emergence of new regional threats, such as North Korea’s
nuclear and missile programs and China’s rapid military modernization,
as having provided further incentives for the Japanese to develop a more
independent defense capability. Facing these new dangers, Japan should
be inclined to hedge against abandonment by the United States by intro-
ducing aircraft carriers, bombers, long-range missiles, and other weapon
systems currently proscribed under the government interpretation of
Article Nine.17 This hedge is only partly operational. While the Japan
Defense Agency is acquiring aerial refueling capabilities as well as assault
ships with hardened decks, there is limited empirical evidence that Japan
has sought a full-spectrum independent defense capability in the post-
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Cold War period. Defense spending has been flat or falling for a decade,
and recent government plans call for a third consecutive year of military
budget cuts (Glosserman 2005). Moreover, two recent publications––a
report from the Prime Minister’s Council on Security and Defense
Capabilities (known as the Araki Report) and the 2004 National Defense
Program Guideline (NDPG)––declared the U.S.-Japan alliance to be the
essential bulwark of the nation’s defense. The Araki Report even called the
alliance a “public good” for the region. Although realists have long pre-
dicted the development of a Japanese nuclear capability, the NDPG flat-
ly states: “Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent.”18
Meanwhile, one draft proposal from the most revisionist party in the
Diet, the LDP, recently suggested that Japan’s “nonnuclear principles” be
enshrined in the constitution. These are not consistently the actions of an
emerging independent power.
The second alternative is subtler and thus more difficult to dismiss.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, it is argued, has reduced Japan’s strategic
importance to the United States and thus placed pressure on Japan to
increase its contributions to the alliance or risk being abandoned. Viewed
as trapped in an “alliance security dilemma,” Japan is predicted to increase
military support for the alliance, thus requiring the revision of Article
Nine’s ban on collective self-defense operations.19 This view too is prob-
lematic. First, its central assertion—that Japan’s importance to U.S. securi-
ty objectives in the region has declined––is debatable. Scholars argue that
East Asia is the most likely location of a future great power war and the
United States clearly sees North Korea and China as two of its greatest
threats.20 Significantly U.S. planners have so far addressed these threats
largely by leveraging America’s alliance with Japan through such measures
as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Six-Party Talks, and the
recent inclusion of “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan
Strait” among the alliance’s objectives.21 Second, although Japanese leaders
and analysts have expressed concern, there is simply no evidence that the
United States has ever seriously considered “abandoning” Japan
(Mochizuki 1997). Third, Japanese support for softening the ban on col-
lective self-defense has sometimes preceded and even extended beyond U.S.
demands. In 2001, for example, Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)
officials were said to have asked their U.S. interlocutors to pressure the
Japanese government to deploy Aegis destroyers to the Indian Ocean.22
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This was an example of manufactured “foreign pressure” (gaiatsu) in which
the real demand for change came from domestic sources.
Still, the United States is undeniably an important player in Japanese
security policymaking and, by extension, the Article Nine debate. In
recent years, U.S. negotiators have pushed Japan to test the boundaries of
its collective self-defense ban in areas ranging from ballistic missile defense
to the war on terrorism. Thus Japan’s security environment––including
perceived (or manufactured) regional threats and its security relationship
to the United States––certainly has relevance for
debates about national policy. The point here is
simply that focusing solely on balances of power
or on alliance demands ignores key domestic
developments that are a very big part of the
story––perhaps the biggest part and therefore the
one we examine most closely in these pages. In
our view, the rise of revisionism is due largely to recent political and insti-
tutional changes that may have permanently transformed the domestic bal-
ance of power between political forces invested in the Article Nine debate.
Before elaborating on this position, however, we should consider some
other commonly cited explanations.
Generational Change
Some see generational change behind the recent increase in support for
constitutional revision.23 These commentators argue that those who are
too young to have known the devastation of World War II and the turbu-
lent times that followed do not share the same commitment to Article
Nine held by their elders. In this view, the rise to political power of a “post-
war generation” (those now in their thirties, forties, and fifties) threatens
Article Nine. But is generational change at work here? To evaluate this
view, we must answer two questions. First, do differences in attitudes
toward Article Nine correspond to particular age groups? And second,
more specifically, do members of the postwar generation hold significant-
ly different views about Article Nine than those of their elders?
Recent polling data provide surprisingly little evidence of genera-
tional variation––either among politicians or the public. A 2002 Yomiuri
poll of Diet members found that those from the postwar generation
favored amending the constitution at only a slightly greater rate than
the rise of revisionism is
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those from the wartime generation (72 percent vs. 68 percent).24 A 2004
Asahi poll found a similarly small generational difference among the pub-
lic.25 When asked about Article Nine, however, these slight generational
differences disappear. In fact, in the 2002 Diet poll, politicians in their
sixties and seventies actually favored changing Article Nine at a higher
rate than those in their thirties, forties, and fifties. A 2002 NHK poll also
found no perceptible generational differences among the opinions of the
public on Article Nine.26 This result was confirmed in the 2004 Asahi
poll, which found that Japanese in their thirties, forties, and fifties actu-
ally opposed revising Article Nine at higher rates than those in their six-
ties and seventies. In short, living experience of 1945 and its aftermath
does not appear to be a major factor in determining people’s attitudes
about changing the peace clause.27
Nonmajoritarianism
If generational change has not strengthened the drive to amend Article
Nine, then what has? Another possible explanation for Article Nine’s per-
sistence is offered by Peter Katzenstein (1996). Drawing on constructivist
approaches, Katzenstein utilizes norms—collectively held understandings
about social life––to explain postwar Japanese security policy. With regard
to Article Nine, he argues that the constitutive norm of “procedural con-
sultation,” which identifies Japan as a “nonmajoritarian polity that respects
intensely held views of strong minorities,” emerged in the 1950s from the
powerful threat of mass mobilization by progressives eager to avenge polit-
ical defeats during the prewar period. Adopting the nonviolence view of
Article Nine, this progressive minority repeatedly utilized the Diet and the
courts to signal their opposition to the conservative majority’s interpreta-
tion. Faced with this opposition, conservatives shelved the formal amend-
ment effort to avoid railroading a passionate minority. No longer able to
debate on constitutional grounds, conservatives and progressives then
shifted the stage to informal processes wherein government interpretations
became established criteria that had to be met in order to avoid further
political conflict (Katzenstein 1996: 118–21).
Katzenstein’s explanation is open to question on several grounds. First,
the constitution requires a two-thirds majority in the Diet and a simple
majority in a public referendum to be amended. Since supporters of
Article Nine occupied more than a third of the seats in the national assem-
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bly for most of the postwar period, it was a legal norm, not a social one as
Katzenstein contends, that necessitated the observance of nonmajoritari-
anism in the debate over formally revising Article Nine. Second, with ref-
erence to informal means of challenging Article Nine, Katzenstein’s argu-
ment turns on the assumption that those opposing the 1954 interpretation
always formed a majority. In several crucial debates, however, this was not
the case. As we shall see, Ozawa Ichir -o’s effort to reinterpret the ban on
collective self-defense and dispatch Japan’s Self-Defense Force to the
Persian Gulf in 1990 failed not only because of progressive opposition to
the content of his proposal but also due to strong opposition from within
his own party. In this crucial case, a Diet majority in fact supported the
substance of the 1954 interpretation, forcing Ozawa to withdraw his draft
legislation without a vote. Such cases of a majority forcing a committed
minority to observe Article Nine’s constraints violates Katzenstein’s thesis
on two dimensions: the majority and minority positions are switched (the
majority supports Article Nine), and the result is a majoritarian outcome
(the revisionist minority is defeated). Although Katzenstein is correct that
the majority Liberal Democratic Party found ways to “normalize” relations
with its opponents in the Diet following the turbulent experiences of the
1950s, the success of this effort in the Article Nine debate stemmed more
from the existence of a strong support base for the peace clause within
conservative circles than from mere capitulation to a vocal minority.
A third problem with the nonmajoritarian explanation is that it fails
to explain a period of vital importance: the late 1990s. Following spectac-
ular electoral defeats in 1992, 1993, and 1996, the “strong minority” of
progressives Katzenstein cites supporting Article Nine was weakened as an
organized political force. Thus the decline of the left during this time pres-
ents a puzzle for his theory: how has Article Nine survived in the absence
of a strong minority voice? With the collapse of the “1955 System”––the
stable political constellation of the ruling LDP and the permanent social-
ist opposition––the relationship between the ruling and opposition parties
has become far more complex. In the current era of coalition governments,
majoritarian outcomes have become increasingly common. Thus as the
old left/right spectrum has receded in Japanese politics, nonmajoritarian-
ism in interparty relations has lost much of its theoretical relevance to the
Article Nine debate. Yet Article Nine still survives. Why?
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Antimilitarism
A final explanation posits a set of culturally defined norms and perceptions
constituting an aversion to the use of the military in foreign affairs.
Thomas Berger argues that a “culture of antimilitarism” arose from
Japanese efforts to assign meaning to their devastating defeat in World
War II and became institutionalized in state structures and practices affect-
ing security policy (1993: 131). Article Nine may thus be counted among
the important institutionalized forms of this culture. The antimilitarist
explanation has problems, however, when applied to Article Nine. First, as
Berger concedes, Article Nine predated the emergence and consolidation
of antimilitarism. Thus although antimilitarism may be asserted to have
played a role in sustaining Article Nine in later periods, it does not explain
Article Nine’s survival during the 1950s when the nascent culture was
being established.
A second problem involves the characterization of all relevant politi-
cal positions as culturally driven. For example, Berger refers to a group of
political centrists, led by Yoshida Shigeru, as advocates of a “merchant
nation” (ch-onin kokka) identity—a vision of a nation focusing on eco-
nomic development while avoiding the pursuit of military power (1996:
336). He argues that commitment to promoting and following this iden-
tity drove Yoshida and his cohorts to establish and institutionalize the
antimilitarist triumvirate of Article Nine, the SDF, and the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty. But centrists did not couch their security policy positions
in identity terms, particularly in the immediate postwar period.28 Instead
they justified favored policies by emphasizing their practical consequences
rather than their consistence with a particular national vision. When cen-
trists did use identity language, it was generally to support other aspects of
the postwar national order, such as the role of the emperor or the impor-
tance of democracy (Benfell 1998: 9). On the whole, in both their strate-
gic calculus and public discourse, Yoshida and his followers focused on
national interest rather than national identity.
A third problem with the antimilitarism explanation is its failure to
explain the rise of revisionism in the 1990s. Berger argues that only a mas-
sive exogenous shock, such as the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan alliance in
the midst of growing external threats, is capable of affecting significant
change in Japanese political culture (1998: 209–10). Since revisionism has
blossomed in the absence of such a shock, antimilitarism fails to explain
why Article Nine is facing a serious challenge for the first time since the
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1950s. We address this puzzle in the next three sections by highlighting
the domestic political dynamics that have resulted in Article Nine’s reten-
tion over the last half-century.
The Dynamics of Stasis: Article Nine in the 1950s
Prior to the current effort––which began after the 1991 Gulf War––there
was just one sustained constitutional revision movement. Mounted in the
1950s, it was led by anti-mainstream conservatives––literally the parents
and grandparents of the LDP faction in power since 2000. They failed,
not because a politically constrained right was forced to acquiesce to the
demands of the pacifist left, but because conser-
vatives within the LDP were divided on the
issue. To understand how Article Nine has per-
sisted despite broad-based pressures for change,
we must examine the motivations and strategies
of three political groups that have battled over
the constitution since the 1950s. In particular,
we make two assertions. First, the strength of
these warring factions has shifted over the years with important implica-
tions for Article Nine’s survival. Second, despite this episodic waxing and
waning, the three major groups have endured. In a precarious balancing
act, two of these groups have continued to offer vital support for Article
Nine. Understanding how Article Nine has persisted in the face of inter-
nal and external pressures for change is thus predicated on tracing the
interaction of these groups in the policymaking process.
The first group was a collection of conservative politicians led in the
immediate postwar years by Hatoyama Ichir -o and, later, by Kishi
Nobusuke. Many had been career politicians during the prewar years as
members of the Seiy-ukai party. As a result of their
association with the wartime government, a large
portion of the group had been forced from pub-
lic life by purges during the occupation. Imbued
with traditional nationalist (though not ultrana-
tionalist) sentiments, these “revisionists” held to
an organic vision of Japan as a unique “national
polity” (kokutai) distinguished primarily by its
imperial institution and neo-Confucian values, which emphasize unity
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notion of national identity with realpolitik beliefs emphasizing the nation’s
duty to ensure its own security. Accordingly they favored a combination of
rearmament and conventional alliances. To achieve these ends, they called
for revision of Article Nine, argued to rebuild Japan’s military capabilities,
and sought a reciprocal security commitment with the United States.
The second group comprised pragmatic conservative politicians led in
the immediate postwar years by Yoshida Shigeru and, later, by his disciples
such as Ikeda Hayato, Sat-o Eisaku, and Miyazawa Kiichi. Yoshida built the
group through his long tenure as prime minister during and immediately
after the U.S. occupation. He surrounded himself with like-minded politi-
cians, many of whom had served with him during his days in the Foreign
Ministry. Interestingly the group’s vision of national identity was not sig-
nificantly different from that of the revisionists. Many were devoted to the
emperor and dedicated to seeing Japan reemerge among the ranks of great
nations.30 Where Yoshida and his followers differed from the revisionists
was not in their understanding of national identity but in the beliefs they
applied to questions of foreign policy and national development.
Pragmatist foreign policy was dominated by two ideas from the Meiji
era—the notions that economic success and technological autonomy were
the prerequisites of national security and that alliance with the world’s
ascendant power was the best means to buy time until the former could be
achieved.31 Taking cues from the Meiji oligarchs, whom Yoshida revered,
pragmatists rejected focusing on military spending in favor of a broad-
based plan for the state-led development of the private sector. Burdened
by war devastation and cut off from traditional regional markets by the
emerging Cold War, Yoshida and his cohorts departed somewhat from
their Meiji model in the extent of their single-minded emphasis on the
civilian economy. It is important to note, however, that they considered
this strategy a temporary one.32 In addition, as had the Meiji oligarchs, the
pragmatists sought an alliance with the world’s strongest power. But fear-
ing unnecessary entanglements in Cold War superpower conflicts, they
pursued an unequal alliance—one in which Japan’s security was guaran-
teed by the United States without Japanese reciprocation.
These two groups of conservatives diverged in two important respects.
First, they disagreed about the causes of national wealth and power. And
second, they disagreed about whether Japan should be “big” or “small.”
Specifically, pragmatists correctly read that the United States was eager to
use Japan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and judged that they could
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hedge the risks of a U.S. alliance with a focus on commercial economic
development. The unequal nature of the alliance ran counter to the
realpolitik beliefs of the revisionists, but it did guarantee the twin goals of
prosperity and security without entangling Japan in American wars. These
pragmatists (sometimes called “mainstream conservatives”) dominated
cabinets under which all three pillars of Japan’s postwar security apparatus
were established: Article Nine, the Self-Defense Force, and the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty. Cabinets led by pragmatists also established such timely
codicils as the “nonnuclear principles,” the “arms export ban,” and the “1
Percent of GNP” limit to defense spending, each of which they success-
fully defended from attacks by revisionists within the LDP (sometimes
called the “anti-mainstream” conservatives).
Pragmatists favored retention of Article Nine because it proved useful
in two ways. First, invoking Article Nine allowed pragmatists to deflect
American pressure for the acquisition of military capabilities they judged
unnecessary or inimical to Japan’s strategic inter-
ests––defined comprehensively. Second, they
found Article Nine an effective means of resisting
U.S. demands for Japanese participation in inter-
national military operations. Conscious of the
difficulties of managing an alliance with a superpower, pragmatists found
the ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense a useful means
of avoiding unnecessary entanglements in American Cold War strategy. To
pragmatists, Article Nine was an indispensable instrument for protecting
Japanese interests within the U.S.-Japan alliance.33
The third group comprised intellectuals, labor activists, and leftist
politicians who viewed Japan as a “peace nation” (heiwa kokka) and cate-
gorically opposed the use of organized violence. Initially put forward by a
group of progressive intellectuals known as the Heiwa Mondai Danwakai
(Peace Issues Discussion Group), the “peace nation” conception had two
pillars: a commitment to peace as a supreme value and a related conviction
that it was Japan’s unique mission to show the world by its own example
the inherent value of this commitment. Viewing security in the nuclear
age as transformed, the Heiwa Mondai Danwakai argued that coopera-
tion, rather than competition, was the strategic dynamic most likely to
avoid apocalyptic wars. The mission of spreading this new logic fell to
Japan as a consequence of its tremendous wartime suffering and its “natu-
ral” pacifist tendencies.34
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The initial political bearer of this identity was a group of left-wing
socialists led by Suzuki Mosabur -o. Many members of the Suzuki faction
had opposed the war and consequently suffered under the militarist
regime. Early enthusiasts of Article Nine, members of this group were
committed pacifists and adherents of the Shidehara interpretation. Shaped
by their experiences and the ideas of the Heiwa
Mondai Danwakai, the Suzuki faction succeeded
in institutionalizing the identity in the party’s
“principles of peace,” which called for neutralism
and opposed rearmament. By the early 1950s,
the Japan Socialist Party had pledged support for
Article Nine and opposition to rearmament and the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty, a doctrine it called “unarmed neutrality” (hibus -o ch-uritsu). Thus
pacifists did not trust Japan with a full military capability, preferring
instead to rely on international public opinion, diplomacy, and passive
resistance to counter security threats. They expanded their grassroots net-
works during the 1950s and by the end of the decade had become a
notable political and social force.
Shifts in the domestic balance of power among these three groups are
at the heart of Japan’s continually renegotiated compromise on Article
Nine and national security policy. Until recently, each of these groups rep-
resented a significant percentage of both the political elite and the elec-
torate. For this reason, any security policy issue required support from at
least two in order to remain politically viable. In the case of Article Nine,
a winning coalition was formed in the early postwar years between the
pragmatists and the pacifists. Although this was an uneasy alliance across
party lines, their coalition proved stable and was marked by a surprising
level of cooperation. It effectively protected Article Nine from numerous
challenges––especially during the turbulent and formative 1950s. In par-
ticular, this coalition proved effective in three key security policy negotia-
tions: the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1951; the Mutual Security
Assistance (MSA) agreement, which led to the establishment of the SDF
in 1954; and the revision of the security treaty in 1960.
Pragmatists appear to have discovered the value of Article Nine dur-
ing negotiations over the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty with John Foster
Dulles, the State Department representative and head U.S. negotiator.
Prime Minister Yoshida entered these discussions intent on realizing his
own formula for postoccupation security: (1) a treaty with the United
pacifists did not trust
Japan with a full mili-
tary capability 
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States guaranteeing Japan’s security; (2) the establishment of a low-cost
constabulary force to handle internal security matters; and (3) the provi-
sion of bases in Japan for U.S. forces. The plan reflected his concern for
prioritizing commercial economic development as well as his affinity for
alliances with ascendant powers. Yet it also seemed to contravene the “non-
violence” interpretation of Article Nine offered by Yoshida on numerous
past occasions. As the negotiations neared, Yoshida began to withdraw
from this position in order to allow Japan ready access to the important
carrot of basing rights.35
Dulles, by contrast, sought “mutuality” in any future security rela-
tionship—a condition that to him entailed significant rearmament.
Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States began to
assert increasing pressure on Japan to rearm. At
MacArthur’s order, Japan established the
National Police Reserves, which took over the
duties of U.S. forces shifted to Korea. Although
external security was not a mission of the NPR,
the United States decided that Japan should be
similar to Adenauer’s Germany, conventionally
armed and capable of engaging in collective self-defense operations with-
in the regional theater (Dower 1979: 387–88). Yoshida responded to this
pressure by arguing that U.S. demands ran counter to Article Nine and the
overwhelming will of the Japanese people (Yoshida 1962: 266). By treat-
ing the matter as a constitutional issue, he injected the complications of
constitutional revision into the ratification process of the proposed securi-
ty pact. The invocation of Article Nine thus provided ballast for Yoshida’s
main practical arguments against rearmament: not only could the weak
Japanese economy not bear the costs, but other countries, particularly
potential trading partners in Asia, would oppose it. To maintain this posi-
tion, Yoshida declared that the NPR neither violated his interpretation of
Article Nine nor represented rearmament in any form.
Yoshida’s use of Article Nine as a negotiating tool did not end there.
After Dulles again urged rearmament in the second round of negotiations
in January 1951, Yoshida secretly contacted Suzuki Mosabur-o and other
left-wing socialists to encourage their agitation against rearmament.
Although this is the only documented case of direct cooperation between
Yoshida and the left-wing socialists, one scholar asserts it is “undoubtedly
the tip of the iceberg.”36 Confronted with this broadly based resistance,
the United States began
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Dulles backed down. Accepting Article Nine as the baseline for any nego-
tiated outcome, he scaled down his demands to only a token commitment
to the goal of collective security. In response, Yoshida pledged to establish
a force designed for external security sometime in the near future,
although he stopped short of promising a force capable of operating out-
side Japanese territory. In the end, Dulles concluded, “the U.S. cannot
press the Japanese to assume military obligations until they have dealt with
their constitutional problem” (Kataoka 1991: 93).
The negotiation over Mutual Security Assistance took place in a
changed domestic political environment. Although Yoshida’s pragmatist
faction was still in power, it was challenged on the right by newly de-
purged revisionists led by Hatoyama Ichir-o following the 1952 lower
house election. To guard his right flank, Yoshida had the newly reformed
CLB issue the “modern warfare” interpretation of Article Nine. This move
not only increased his flexibility in dealing with revisionist opponents
demanding rearmament but also allowed him simultaneously to argue that
the force levels demanded by the United States were constitutionally for-
bidden (Nakamura 2001: 99). Yoshida subsequently reached an agreement
with revisionists in the opposition Progressive Party to establish a military
force dedicated to maintaining external security and entered the MSA
negotiations with a measure of conservative unity and Article Nine still up
his sleeve.
The MSA program was an American initiative designed to exchange
military and economic aid for increased military preparedness on the part
of allied countries. Early on, Yoshida and his chief negotiator, Ikeda
Hayato, responded to U.S. demands for increased defense efforts by rein-
forcing dire references to the “shallow economy” with constitutional argu-
ments (Dower 1979: 441–42, 452–53, 461–62). In response, Vice-
President Richard Nixon, frustrated by the repeated invocations of Article
Nine, publicly declared the article a “mistake” during a 1953 trip to Japan
(Hook and McCormack 2001: 13–14). Facing a united conservative
majority, however, Dulles agreed to a compromise that provided aid in
exchange for the establishment of ground, sea, and air forces with the
explicit mission of maintaining Japan’s external security. In May 1954, the
Diet passed the MSA agreement along with legislation reorganizing
domestic forces into the SDF. Both measures contained the specific stipu-
lation that future military expansion would be in accordance with the con-
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stitution. The SDF bills were also accompanied by a Diet resolution ban-
ning the overseas dispatch of the newly created force.
The negotiations over the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
took place under a further evolving political environment. The 1955 lower
house election proved a victory for both the Hatoyama group, which
promised constitutional revision, and the left-wing socialists, which
pledged to defend Article Nine at all costs. In the following months, the
left- and right-wing socialists reunited to establish the Japan Socialist Party
(JSP), while conservative forces merged themselves for the first time in the
LDP. Although Hatoyama remained prime minister, the socialists for the
first time obtained enough seats in the Diet to block constitutional
amendments outright. These mixed electoral results reflected a growing
polarization in Japanese society over the revision issue. In 1954, the left-
wing socialists had joined with labor unions to establish the National
Union for Constitutional Defense (Kenp-o Y-ogo Kokumin Reng-o), an
umbrella organization of political, labor, and civic groups opposed to
amending the constitution. Revisionists established less influential civic
action groups but nonetheless managed to produce varied revision pro-
posals. After being initially supportive of revision throughout 1954, the
media became increasingly divided. Not surprisingly, public opinion dur-
ing this period showed marked ambivalence over the issue.37
Faced with these conditions, revisionists linked Article Nine with their
effort to revise the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The security treaty had
become increasingly unpopular in Japan during the 1950s. Criticism from
both the left and the right highlighted its many “unequal” features, includ-
ing the lack of an explicit U.S. security guarantee in exchange for the pro-
vision of bases. Progressives and conservatives joined to protest these sta-
tus issues as infringements on national sovereignty. A second matter
involved Japan’s passive role in the alliance. After becoming prime minis-
ter in February 1957, Kishi Nobusuke attempted to weave these two
streams of discontent into an indirect assault on Article Nine. While
addressing the nagging “status” issues, Kishi hoped to introduce collective
self-defense to the security relationship on at least a regional basis.38
Making treaty revision a central goal of his administration, Kishi
sounded out Dulles on the issue in June 1957. Although Dulles rebuffed
this initial request, he and President Eisenhower, who were impressed by
Kishi’s strong showing in the 1958 lower house election and no doubt
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enthusiastic about his anticommunist and revisionist credentials, eventu-
ally agreed to renegotiate the security treaty. In addition, they removed
their earlier linkage of Article Nine revision with treaty renegotiation.
Rather than demanding that Kishi expend the tremendous political capi-
tal necessary to revise Article Nine prior to treaty negotiations, Dulles
instead offered him an opportunity to score a relatively easy political vic-
tory. Such a victory might elevate Kishi’s domestic stature and thus
increase his future effectiveness in bringing about constitutional change
and a collective self-defense arrangement.39
Whatever his long-term ambitions, Kishi lacked the votes to pass a
treaty revision that challenged the constitutional status quo during this
period. Pragmatists were now joined by a sizable group of pacifists in sup-
porting Article Nine. Yoshida, who maintained influence through his trust-
ed lieutenants Ikeda Hayato and Sat-o Eisaku, continued to restrain fervor
for constitutional revision within the LDP, while Suzuki Mosabur-o now led
a pacifist-dominated JSP holding more than 35 percent of the seats in the
House of Representatives. Even in the LDP, only the Kishi and Ishii fac-
tions could be considered thoroughly revisionist at this time (Fukui 1970:
221). Moreover, with the removal of the constitutional dimension from the
treaty negotiations, the socialists called for the abrogation of the treaty and
pragmatists and revisionists alike had become cool to the entire enterprise.
Two factors explain this unexpected opposition. First, the escalation of
tensions between the United States and China in the Taiwan Straits begin-
ning in August 1958 accentuated Article Nine’s value as a means of avoid-
ing Japanese entrapment in a future conflict. Faced with the possibility of
being “drawn into” (makikomareru) a regional war likely to harm Japan’s
interests, pragmatists balked at handing a political victory to revisionist
Kishi, and even other revisionists began to have second thoughts. In the
wake of the militarized dispute in the Taiwan Straits, for example, K-ono
Ichir-o, a revisionist and key Kishi ally in the LDP, began to argue that con-
stitutional revision was “ideal but impossible” (Kataoka 1991: 194–96).
Second, the position of the left wing within the JSP was strengthened
when Kishi introduced legislation to enhance the powers of the police.
Viewing this as a strategy to suppress their movement, the socialists uni-
fied around an anti-Kishi platform calling for abrogation of the security
treaty and opposing treaty revision. After Kishi told a foreign reporter he
hoped eventually to “abrogate” Article Nine, the JSP intensified its efforts
to defeat both the new police legislation and the treaty revision.40
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The remainder of the treaty revision episode became a cautionary tale
for the revision movement. Pragmatists and pacifists first joined to force
Kishi to table his police legislation in November 1958. The next eighteen
months saw the largest mass protests in Japan’s postwar history, organized
by the National Congress for Opposition to the Security Treaty, a coali-
tion of leftist political parties, labor unions, student organizations, and
civic action groups. Yoshida and the pragmatists, meanwhile, continued
to withhold their support for treaty revision until Kishi agreed to name
Ikeda as his successor in December 1959 (Kataoka 1991: 199–200).
During the Diet debate that followed the treaty signing in January 1960,
Kishi and his foreign minister repeatedly acknowledged the ban on col-
lective self-defense under fierce questioning from both the opposition and
members of their own party. The spectacle of staunch revisionists invok-
ing Article Nine for strategic and political advantage would be duplicat-
ed in ensuing decades—up to and including Japan’s dispatch of troops to
Iraq in 2004.41
The episode reached a crescendo in May 1960 when Kishi forced the
revised treaty through the Diet despite the JSP’s obstructionist tactics.
During the following week, the media condemned Kishi’s action, while an
unprecedented number of mass demonstrations and strikes were held in
opposition to the treaty. The combined onslaught forced Kishi to cancel a
scheduled visit by Eisenhower and eventually to resign as prime minister
in June. Ikeda succeeded him as prime minister, returning the mainstream
conservatives to power. Although the new treaty became law, the joint
efforts of pragmatist factions within the LDP and the pacifist left suc-
ceeded in unseating Kishi and averting constitutional revision. In 1964,
when a commission created by the Diet to consider constitutional issues
submitted a final report in which the majority of commissioners backed
revising Article Nine, Ikeda simply ignored it (Ward 1965: 408–25).
In the years between 1947 and 1954, when the core structures of
Japan’s postwar security system were established, pragmatists were indis-
pensable to the retention of Article Nine. During
this period, de-purged revisionists returned to
public life in great numbers, pacifists were weak-
ly organized within the socialist movement, the
United States placed direct pressure on Japan to
revise the constitution, and both the public and
media remained open to rearmament and constitutional revision.
pragmatists were indis-
pensable to the retention
of Article Nine 
26 J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels
Although assessing counterfactuals is not an exact science, these factors
point to the decisive significance of pragmatism for Article Nine’s survival.
Pragmatists established Article Nine as the central weapon against expan-
sive U.S. demands during security negotiations, resurrected the CLB to
create and maintain interpretations useful for this purpose, and covertly
cooperated with pacifists on the left. The combined result of these acts
frustrated revisionists at home and abroad by strengthening Article Nine’s
place in the institutional structure and political discourse.
Article Nine’s persistence after 1954, however, reflects the contribu-
tions of both pragmatism and pacifism. By mid-decade, a single pacifist-
dominated party was able to block any attempt at formal amendment of
the constitution. Pacifists’ reliance on extraparliamentary tactics helped
spread the “peace nation” identity to a broad set of social actors. Although
they were incapable of stopping regular legislation through normal parlia-
mentary procedures, their use of obstructionist tactics proved effective on
occasion (Packard 1966: 101–5). Pragmatists too played a significant role.
The CLB continued to keep vigilant watch over Yoshida’s interpretation,
even during revisionist administrations. More important, the large num-
ber of pragmatists within the LDP constrained revisionists while also
maintaining their power position within the intraparty factional balance
(Fukui 1970: 225–26). It is this deep internal division––between revi-
sionists and pragmatists––within the dominant conservative party that
most protected Article Nine from formal change during this time.
Without it the coalition of pragmatists and pacifists in support of Article
Nine would not have been possible. During the late 1950s, this coalition
proved decisive in delivering legislative defeats that weakened revisionist
influence and frustrated the constitutional revision project. This was also
the case in negotiations with the United States. In one remembrance, for-
mer Yoshida lieutenant Miyazawa Kiichi praised the effectiveness of cou-
pling Article Nine with the threat of the pacifist left as a bargaining tactic
and argued that this combination proved decisive in enabling Japan to
avoid unnecessary concessions in the bilateral negations of this period. In
this way, he concedes that the pacifists were useful adversaries during the
1950s (Miyazawa 1997: 12).
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War and Peacekeeping: Article Nine in the 1990s
Despite monumental structural shifts since 1960—particularly the rise of
the Japanese economy—Article Nine and the 1954 interpretation survived
the next three decades without significant
change. The decade of the 1990s, however,
brought with it international and domestic pres-
sures that have given new life to the constitu-
tional debate in general and the drive to revise
Article Nine in particular. More important,
changes have occurred in the way the govern-
ment applies Article Nine and in the relative power of the three groups
involved in the debate.
The three groups assumed their customary roles in the first major
security crisis of the period, the 1991 Gulf War. Following Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait, the United States placed intense pressure on the administration
of Kaifu Toshiki to provide financing and personnel for the international
effort to liberate the Gulf Coast state. The Kaifu government was divided
between pragmatists and revisionists. Kaifu, a pragmatist, was head of a
small faction and needed the support of others to remain in office. As a
result, Japan’s initial response was driven by a small group of revisionists—
led by LDP Secretary-General Ozawa Ichir -o—who held high factional
and party posts but were not cabinet members.42 Ozawa and his allies put
forward the United Nations Peace Cooperation Corps (UNPCC) bill,
which called for a small contingent of lightly armed SDF members to be
dispatched to the Gulf region to conduct activities such as the monitoring
of cease-fire agreements as well as medical, transportation, and communi-
cations support (Hirano 1996: 36–39). The bill was accompanied by a
new constitutional interpretation, promoted by Ozawa, arguing that the
dispatch of SDF troops overseas under UN command was constitutional,
even if the mission involved the use of force.
Predictably, pacifists in the JSP and K-omeit -o, a small centrist party
founded in the 1960s by the Buddhist lay organization S-oka Gakkai,
joined forces with pragmatists in the LDP, such as Got-oda Masaharu and
Miyazawa Kiichi, to oppose the reinterpretation. In the protracted and
chaotic Diet debate that followed, the government’s various spokesmen
repeatedly gave contradictory and incoherent accounts of the scope of the
proposed activities and their relationship to Article Nine. The CLB also
international and
domestic pressures [gave]
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refused to offer a concrete example illustrating when transporting weapons
and ammunition did not constitute the use of force. In the end, the CLB
director-general reasserted his organization’s original position by declaring
that there was “some room for doubt about the constitutionality of SDF
participation in a United Nations force” (Odawara 1991: 13). Forced to
withdraw the bill without a vote, Ozawa and his supporters settled for a
large monetary contribution and, once hostilities ceased, the deployment
of minesweepers to the Gulf (Purrington and A. K. 1992: 318–19).
Soon thereafter, however, signs of change appeared. Stung by interna-
tional criticism of Japan’s failure to provide troops, the Japanese public
shifted to support the minesweeper deployment (Purrington 1992: 171).
Picking up on popular sentiment, revisionists began to paint Article Nine
as an obstacle to “international cooperation” and the cause of a significant
national embarrassment. Wielding the humiliation of “checkbook diplo-
macy” and assisted by conservatives in the media, the revisionists attacked
the pragmatists and the pacifists simultaneously and declared war on the
CLB. And, for the first time, they began to win.
Shortly after the failure of the UNPCC bill, revisionists pursued new
legislation to allow the SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping operations
(“the PKO bill”). Ozawa was particularly active
during the two Diet sessions it took to pass the
bill, chairing an influential LDP ad hoc panel
which issued a report arguing that a reinterpreta-
tion of Article Nine was sufficient to allow for
SDF participation in multinational forces oper-
ating under UN command or sanction (LDP
1992: 57). In this interpretation, the SDF would
be permitted to fulfill combat roles. But altering
the interpretation in this way was opposed by Prime Minister Miyazawa,
other pragmatists in the LDP, and the CLB. When Ozawa finally brokered
an agreement on the bill with K-omeit-o and another small centrist party,
the SDF’s mandate saw only modest expansion. Although the passage of
the PKO bill in 1992 marked the first revision of the ban on overseas dis-
patch in nearly 40 years, the old constraints were replaced with new ones.
The centerpiece of these new constraints was the Five Principles.
Developed by the CLB based on their earlier interpretation that the SDF
could not use force as part of a UN army, these principles require the
Japanese government to withdraw its troops at the first sign of hostilities
the passage of the PKO
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while denying the SDF the right to use force to accomplish the mission of
the UN operation. The Five Principles helped gain the support of not only
pragmatists in the LDP but pacifist parties in the Diet as well. The small
centrist parties demanded and received further concessions, however,
including K-omeit -o’s call for a freeze on Peacekeeping Force (PKF) partic-
ipation, which kept the SDF from performing such duties as cease-fire
monitoring, weapons collection and disposal, and buffer zone patrols. In
more than a decade since the enactment of the PKO Law, the SDF has
participated in numerous UN operations without major incident and with
full public support.
From the 1950s through the 1990s, revisionists retained their realpoli-
tik beliefs about security. As the decade of the 1990s progressed, they
began to emphasize new foreign threats, such as North Korea’s missile and
nuclear programs, to justify a more muscular defense posture. They con-
tinued to seek to upgrade Japan’s position in the U.S.-Japan alliance to
that of an equal partner. Accordingly a central item on their agenda
remained changing Article Nine to allow for exercise of the right of col-
lective self-defense.43
Over the decades, revisionists reproduced themselves in a variety of
ways. First, as noted earlier, their numbers include several second- and
third-generation politicians who have adopted
constitutional positions similar to those of their
fathers and grandfathers.44 Second, they leveraged
intraparty institutions such as the party platform
and committee system to keep revisionist senti-
ment alive.45 They also established civic action
groups and developed ties with academics and
journalists who support their views.46 Both these
intraparty and extraparty activities have pro-
duced reports and proposals that placed revisionist views in the public
domain.47 Finally, they repeatedly attacked security policies associated with
Article Nine, such as Nakasone’s successful attempt to breach the 1 per-
cent of GNP ceiling on defense spending (Pyle 1987: 266–68). All things
considered, revisionists entered the post-Cold War period well positioned
to renew the assault on Article Nine.
After their initial Gulf War victory, by contrast, pacifists and pragma-
tists limped through the 1990s. Pacifists were particularly hard hit. Leftist
parties were unable to redefine themselves in the post-Cold War era and
revisionists entered the
post-Cold War period
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have been decimated. Instructive in this regard is the experience of the
JSP, now called the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). As centrist
parties, such as K-omeit -o, began to accept the nonaggression view of
Article Nine during the 1970s in order to facilitate cooperation with the
governing LDP, the JSP had struggled to maintain its commitment to state
nonviolence (Keddell 1993: 31–77). Thus when JSP Chairman
Murayama Tomiichi declared his party’s support for the U.S.-Japan
alliance and the constitutionality of the SDF in 1994 (as part of a deal to
form a coalition government with the LDP), some commentators declared
pacifism as a political ideal “gone with the wind.”48 Adding insult to injury,
this key policy shift came in the midst of a series of spectacular electoral
defeats that reduced the socialists’ lower house contingent from 136 seats
in 1990 to a mere 6 in 2003.
Still, shifting positions and weakened Diet numbers have not com-
pletely neutralized pacifists in the Article Nine debate. In the years since
1994, the socialists have continued to emphasize the heiwa kokka identity
in their rhetoric, and a connection between rhetoric and policy positions
has remained.49 Despite dropping their constitutional objections to the
SDF and the U.S.-Japan alliance, the socialists have shifted their security
policies only slightly. Their new defense program calls for the reduction
and decentralization of the SDF, the establishment of a regional security
organization, and the eventual transformation of the U.S.-Japan alliance to
a nonmilitary relationship. In addition, the party has refocused its defense
of Article Nine to oppose change in the 1954 interpretation. 
K-omeit-o’s conversion may be viewed in a similar light. Prompted by the
strong pacifist sentiments of S-oka Gakkai, the K-omeit-o platform calls for
the literal realization of a “peace nation” and asserts that Japan has a his-
toric mission to spread peace throughout the world.50 Thus both K-omeit-o
and the socialists appear to have relinquished their claim of de jure state
pacifism in exchange for the potential to preserve de facto state pacifism in
the policy trenches.51 Those who used to mock the 1954 interpretation
have now become its strongest defenders.
There are other reasons why pacifism cannot be completely dis-
missed. First, a group of former socialists and K-omeit-o members have
formed a pacifist block within the Democratic Party of Japan, the largest
opposition party. Under the leadership of former socialist Yokomichi
Takahiro, the group has continued to emphasize “peace nation” rhetoric
even in the midst of a party that has grown increasingly hawkish in its ori-
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entation.52 Second, while representing a significantly smaller portion of
the Diet than in past decades, pacifist parties and factions (SDPJ, JCP, 
K-omeit-o, and Yokomichi’s DPJ) still combine to hold about a sixth of the
seats in the House of Representatives and nearly
a quarter of the seats in the House of
Councilors.53 Finally, and most important, paci-
fists’ embrace of the 1954 interpretation has
made them acceptable coalition partners for the LDP. As first the social-
ists and then K-omeit-o formed coalition governments with the LDP, they
came closer to the seat of power than at any time since the late 1940s. As
we shall see, this achievement has helped them constrain revisionism
within the LDP and compensate somewhat for their declining numbers
in the Diet.
During the Cold War, pragmatists reproduced themselves through
factional ties and government institutions. Yoshida’s influence ensured that
his beliefs about security, as well as his assessment of the usefulness of
Article Nine, were passed on to a cadre of younger factional leaders includ-
ing future prime ministers Ikeda Hayato and Sat-o Eisaku. Accordingly, as
key players in government during the early postwar period, pragmatists
were able to institutionalize their constitutional ideas in government prac-
tice.54 In addition, pragmatists found support from the CLB, which, driv-
en by institutional incentives, continued to constrain the reinterpretation
schemes of revisionists.55 Finally, like revisionists, pragmatists had some
success establishing ties with academics through research institutes.56
Despite this record of success, by the late 1990s the political ground
had begun to shift beneath the pragmatists’ feet. In 1998, Kat-o K-oichi,
leader of the largest pragmatist faction in the LDP (the former Miyazawa
faction), staged a rebellion against the party leadership. When it failed,
the resulting fiasco led to the breakup of his faction and a significant
reduction in the organized power of pragmatists within the LDP.
Although pragmatists from other factions, such as Nonaka Hiromu,
would remain prominent in the party hierarchy for a few more years, the
flameout of the Kat-o faction would prove a harbinger of things to come
for the pragmatists.
The three years following the passage of the PKO bill saw dramatic
changes in both the international and domestic political environments.
Internationally, the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear program in 1994–95
forced U.S.-Japan alliance managers to focus on a new regional security
pacifism cannot be com-
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problem. The escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Straits in 1996 brought
back memories of 1958. Domestically, the LDP lost power for the first
time in 38 years when Ozawa and others led defectors out of the party and
were rewarded by voters in the July 1993 election. What followed were
years of coalition governments that combined revisionists, pragmatists,
and pacifists in awkward, if not quite haphazard, ways (O
-
take 2000).
The next challenge to Article Nine came from familiar quarters.
Pressure from Washington—combined with agitation from LDP revi-
sionists, the Japan Defense Agency, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA)—yielded the 1995 National Defense Program Outline
(NDPO), which called for Japan to ensure smooth implementation of
U.S.-Japan security arrangements in the event of a situation in the “areas
surrounding Japan” that might affect Japan’s security (sh-uhen jitai).
Unsatisfied with this accomplishment, revisionists, now split between the
LDP and Ozawa’s New Frontier Party (NFP), pushed the JSP-LDP coali-
tion government to reinterpret Article Nine in order to allow for collec-
tive self-defense (Mochizuki 1997: 13–14). But pragmatists such as K-ono
Y-ohei and Kat-o K-oichi, who opposed any changes to Article Nine, dom-
inated the LDP leadership at this time. As a result of these divisions, the
new guidelines governing the U.S.-Japan alliance (released in September
1997) committed Japan to provide only “rear area support” (k -oh -o chiiki
shien) for U.S. forces in the event of a regional emergency involving
Japan’s security.
To enact changes required by the new guidelines, the LDP introduced
three related bills to the Diet in 1998. Now led by Prime Minister Obuchi
Keiz-o, the LDP formed a coalition government with Ozawa’s tiny Liberal
Party (LP) but required cooperation from K-omeit-o in order to get bills
through the upper house. Internally the LDP was divided into four major
factions; the Miyazawa and Nakasone factions represented the clearest
division between pragmatists and revisionists. Behind the scenes, the
prime mover in the Obuchi government, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka
Hiromu, scrambled to manage Diet business while trying to build a stable
coalition government. A member of Obuchi’s leading faction, Nonaka
advocated pragmatist policies and was a close ally of Kat-o K-oichi, who
would soon succeed Miyazawa as leader of the largest pragmatist faction.
The legislation, drafted under standard CLB oversight, centered on the
bill concerning “situations in areas surrounding Japan,” which allowed the
SDF to provide “rear area support” to U.S. forces in Japan and the sur-
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rounding areas in the event of a military emergency likely to affect Japan’s
security. The new SDF roles included the provision of water, food, and
fuel; the transport of material (with the exception of weapons and ammu-
nition); and medical support. In accordance with the CLB’s interpretation
of the ban on collective self-defense, the SDF was not allowed to use force
to accomplish the goals of these missions. Although a further step away
from the ban on overseas dispatch, the bill fell far short of satisfying revi-
sionist demands for collective self-defense.57
The bills passed the Diet in May 1999 on the strength of the com-
bined votes of the LDP, LP, and K-omeit-o. For its votes, K-omeit-o was able
to get a provision requiring ex ante Diet approval for troop deployments,
with the exception of emergencies, when ex post approval would be
required. Although the party’s position created tensions with its pacifist 
S-oka Gakkai supporters, K-omeit-o’s cooperation on the bill was part of a
larger plan to arrange electoral cooperation with the LDP before the next
lower house election. When explaining the bill to the public, K-omeit-o
leaders took pains to present it as a peace-promoting initiative designed to
“prevent armed conflicts.”58 Having established an important precedent
for cooperating with the LDP on a difficult issue, K-omeit-o then elected
to join its erstwhile conservative opponents in a ruling government. As we
shall see, the continued presence of K-omeit-o in the government has served
as a brake on the revisionist agenda.
Despite a separation of decades, the three groups that divided politics
in the 1950s managed to remain relevant in the Article Nine debate of the
1990s. With the LDP lacking a majority in the upper house, support from
pacifists proved necessary to pass even normal legislation, let alone consti-
tutional amendments. In this regard, pacifists achieved a measure of par-
liamentary power they could only long for in the 1950s. Further, LDP
pragmatists who held important faction, party, and government posts dur-
ing this period also contributed to the blocking of Ozawa’s reinterpretation
attempt during debate over the UNPCC bill.
The debate over Article Nine in the 1990s, however, differed from
that of the 1950s in important ways. First, while pacifism as an organized
political force declined in the Diet, the LDP continually failed to recap-
ture its previous level of one-party dominance. Second, pacifists reframed
their policy goals in more palatable terms. Although continuing to pro-
mote the “peace nation” identity and seeking to constrain security policy,
they accepted the need to work with other players in order to influence
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policy and adjusted their constitutional demands accordingly. The combi-
nation of these factors encouraged a level of overt cooperation between
pragmatists and pacifists that was not possible in
the ideologically divided 1950s. It should thus
be no surprise that on both occasions when the
LDP invited a pacifist party to join a coalition
government, the negotiations were supervised by
pragmatists such as K-ono Y-ohei, Kat-o K-oichi,
and Nonaka Hiromu (Curtis 1999). Able to
coordinate on security issues in a manner not
possible in Yoshida’s time, pragmatists and paci-
fists combined their strengths effectively to oppose major changes to
Article Nine, especially the recognition of collective self-defense. From this
perspective, the numerical decline among pacifists was somewhat com-
pensated for by this new commitment to coalition politics.
Still, revisionists secured several major legislative victories in the
1990s, including the establishment of Diet constitutional research com-
missions that issued their final reports in April 2005. They were also
joined by influential new allies in the media and academia. The Yomiuri
Shimbun, Japan’s largest daily newspaper, has
become a staunch advocate of constitutional
reform, including allowing exercise of the right of
collective self-defense. While Japanese universi-
ties continue to produce and employ academics
advocating pacifist positions, the new generation
includes more scholars in favor of changing Article Nine than was the case
in the 1950s.59 By the end of the decade, revisionist support and accom-
plishments had begun to pile up. The Self-Defense Force was able to
engage in a growing list of widely accepted activities that once had been
deemed unconstitutional. And now the future of Article Nine itself was far
from certain.
Koizumi’s Challenge
Polls of Diet members in recent years have shown growing support for
constitutional revision in general and for amending Article Nine in par-
ticular. In 2002, the Yomiuri Shimbun found that 71 percent of Diet mem-








victories in the 1990s
The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan 35
1997 poll. With regard to Article Nine, the same Yomiuri poll noted that
55 percent of Diet members favored revision, up 14 points from the pre-
vious survey. On the central question of whether Japan should be allowed
to exercise the right to collective self-defense, 54 percent agreed while 40
percent opposed.60
What explains the tremendous rise of revisionist sentiment in the
Diet? Although many factors––including shifts in the regional balance of
power––are in play in the constitutional debate, we continue to find it
useful to focus on the enduring tripartite division among domestic forces.
We trace the rise of revisionism primarily to
three factors: the failure of leftist parties to
redefine themselves in a shifted political
landscape; national and party-level institu-
tional reforms that have strengthened the
role of the prime minister within the LDP
and in the policymaking process; and the leadership of the current prime
minister, Koizumi Junichir-o. In short, changes in partisanship, institu-
tions, and leadership have been critical drivers behind the rise of revision-
ism over the last decade. We now consider each in turn.
Why have leftist parties populated largely by pacifists suffered such
significant electoral defeats over the last decade? Surely this question
requires a complex answer. Perhaps the simplest explanation is that the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 served in some general way to dis-
credit the left in the minds of Japanese voters. We disagree with this
interpretation. For one thing, the Japan Communist Party, certainly the
organization most identified with international communism, actually
gained seats in the Diet for years after the collapse of the Soviet Union
before suffering major defeats in the last few election cycles. Moreover,
leftist parties in other democracies, such as the Communist Party of Italy
or the Labor Party in Britain, were able to reinvent themselves success-
fully in the post-Cold War era.61 This development undermines the asser-
tion that the end of the Cold War spelled doom for leftist parties around
the globe.
Nor was the decline of the old left a direct result of the parties’ posi-
tions on Article Nine. Although the socialists unceremoniously discarded
their signature stance on the constitution while the communists stub-
bornly clung to theirs, the results have been the same. The SDPJ and the
JCP currently hold only eleven and eighteen seats, respectively, in the
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Diet. In our view this decline stemmed primarily from leadership failures.
For example, the seeds of the socialists’ collapse were sown long before the
end of the Cold War, when their leadership failed to defend the party’s
organizational base in the public-sector unions from Nakasone’s adminis-
trative reform drive.62 When these reforms precipitated the 1989 collapse
of S-ohy-o (General Council of Trade Unions in Japan), the largest public-
sector union, the socialists’ long kiss goodnight was already well along. As
international ideological divisions eased following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, leaders of the SDPJ and JCP repeatedly failed to seize the
opportunity to redefine themselves despite the availability of successful
models of “third way” politics from Britain, the United States, Italy, and
elsewhere. The final nail in the SDPJ coffin—Murayama’s disastrous deci-
sion to join the LDP in a coalition government in 1994—is a prime
example of this failure. When the JSP joined its erstwhile enemy in gov-
ernment without a strategy for maintaining its distinctiveness in the
minds of voters, the party’s demoralized base as well as nonaffiliated vot-
ers naturally looked elsewhere for an alternative to the LDP’s conservative
policies. The communists, too, have so far proved unable to hold onto
nonaffiliated (sometimes called “floating”) voters. In particular, their lead-
ers’ refusal to moderate long-held ideological positions has kept them
from cooperating with other opposition parties and relegated them to the
margins of national politics.63
The flip side of the decline of pacifist parties has been the rise of the
LDP as a genuinely revisionist party. We see this as a consequence of two
related factors. First, a series of institutional reforms has strengthened the
LDP party leadership––especially the power of the prime minister and
party president––at the expense of factional leaders and other power cen-
ters both inside and outside the party. And second, the current party lead-
ership, led by Prime Minister Koizumi, is the most popular group of revi-
sionists ever to have held power. There have been revisionist cabinets in the
past, of course, but neither Kishi Nobusuke, Fukuda Takeo, Nakasone
Yasuhiro, nor any other revisionist prime minister had ever enjoyed
Koizumi’s degree of centralized power or popular support. And Koizumi
has directed his strongly revisionist leadership on a course that has pushed
Article Nine to the political front burner for the first time in 50 years.
The institutional changes in question include electoral and campaign
finance reforms, changes in the LDP presidential election process, as well
as several other government and administrative reforms. Although it is still
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too early to know the full impact of these changes, it seems clear that one
of their cumulative effects has been to strengthen the power of the LDP
leadership, particularly the party president and prime minister. The 1994
electoral reforms, for example, which replaced Japan’s infamous multi-
member, single nontransferable vote (SNTV) districts with a combination
of single-seat and proportional representation (PR) districts, reduced
intraparty competition among LDP candidates and thus their dependence
on factional support to get nominated to contest a specific district. Some
have even argued that factional influence is no longer salient in the nom-
ination process for either single-seat or PR districts (Cox et al. 1999:
42–43). Moreover, campaign finance reforms increased party leaders’ con-
trol of the distribution of funds to party candidates. Although factional
leaders had reduced their fund-raising activities beginning in the 1970s,
new regulations banning political donations to groups other than the par-
ties themselves have further strengthened the party leadership’s role in
campaign finance (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004: 15).
The diffusion of factional divisions within the LDP is particularly rel-
evant to the question of Article Nine. As factional leaders jostled for power
within the LDP, they often used positions on constitutional reform to dif-
ferentiate themselves, leaving the party unable to unify on a common revi-
sion position (Fukui 1970). In particular, mainstream factional leaders
advocated the retention of Article Nine while anti-mainstream leaders
sought revision. Even with the emergence of the enormous Tanaka faction
in the 1970s, a relative balance was maintained among pro- and anti-
Article Nine factions and the resulting internal division precluded serious
attempts to revise the peace clause. As these recent reforms have weakened
the power of factional leaders, their role in maintaining the constitutional
status quo within the party has also declined.
The 2001 reform of the LDP presidential election process can be seen
as both a consequence and a further deepening of the decline in factional
power. Angered by the lack of transparency that accompanied the selection
of faction leader Mori Yoshir-o to replace Obuchi Keiz-o following his sud-
den death in 2000, younger LDP Diet members demanded that the party
presidential election process be opened to local party members. Although
faction leaders managed to reduce the weight of votes from outside the
Diet in the system eventually adopted, its first implementation resulted in
the election of Koizumi over his nearest rival, the leader of the largest fac-
tion at that time, Hashimoto Ry-utar-o. This surprising result made
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Koizumi the “first LDP president and prime minister to be selected out-
side the traditional factional power struggles” (Shinoda 2003: 23). If this
procedure continues to be followed, it means that future party leaders will
have to reach beyond the factional balance in the Diet to appeal to local
party leaders, thus further reducing the influence of faction leaders.
Finally, a series of government and administrative reforms passed dur-
ing the late 1990s has increased the role of the prime minister and the cab-
inet in the policymaking process. The first set of measures was demanded
by Ozawa Ichir-o when he brought his now defunct Liberal Party into a
coalition government with the LDP in 1999. They included a reduction
in the size of the cabinet and limitations on the Diet testimony of bureau-
crats, both designed to streamline cabinet decision making and reduce the
influence of bureaucrats in policymaking (Shinoda 2003). The second set
of measures was part of a broad-based administrative reform effort initiat-
ed by the Hashimoto administration in 1998, although some changes were
not implemented until 2001. These included a revision of the Cabinet
Law, which clarified the prime minister’s authority to introduce policy ini-
tiatives and strengthened the ability of cabinet members to take action
without first obtaining the approval of the relevant government bureau-
cracy. The Hashimoto reforms also rationalized the Cabinet Secretariat by
merging three policy offices into one to reduce coordination problems and
creating a director of crisis management. The result has been a more flex-
ible apparatus capable of forming offices on ad hoc issues and reducing
government response time during crises (Schoff 2004: 82–90).
These changes are important to the Article Nine debate because they
have helped the Koizumi administration push the envelope of interpreta-
tion in crafting his responses to the September 11 attacks on the United
States and the 2003 Iraq War. It should also be noted that these changes
were initiated and pushed to realization by revisionists such as Ozawa and
Hashimoto. Although their views on Article Nine, particularly their dis-
may that constitutional interpretations hampered Japan’s response to the
first Gulf War, were likely animating factors in their desire to increase the
power and effectiveness of the prime minister’s office, Article Nine was
clearly only one issue among many. For example, Ozawa, an early oppo-
nent of the multimember district electoral system, supported electoral
reform primarily as part of a broad plan to introduce a two-party system,
which he believed was more effective at governing. Although, as the author
of the UNPCC bill, Ozawa was no doubt particularly angry at Kaifu’s fail-
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ure to dispatch the SDF in 1990, he had developed his electoral reform
plan long before Iraq invaded Kuwait (Samuels 2003a: 328). Moreover,
the overwhelmingly negative view of the Murayama government’s
response to the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995 was another major fac-
tor in the drive to improve crisis management institutions and helped put
strengthening the power of the prime minister’s office on the agenda in the
Hashimoto administration (Shinoda 2003: 25). It is thus impossible to
attribute the motivations behind these reforms solely to the demands of
security policy or the desire to revise Article Nine.
Perhaps even more important, these institutional changes have been
accompanied by the rise of party leaders willing to leverage the new power
they provide. In particular, Prime Minister Koizumi has repeatedly refused
to assign cabinet appointments on the basis of factional affiliations.
Although these reforms have not ended the power of factions, they have
weakened them.64 In the 2003 lower house election, the majority of new
candidates ran without factional affiliation, and today almost 10 percent
of current LDP Diet members have no factional affiliation.
Koizumi’s exercise of these new levers of party power has not been lim-
ited to the apportionment of cabinet posts. He has also used this power to
strengthen his support base within the party. Before becoming prime min-
ister, Koizumi was a member of the faction led by former Prime Minister
Mori Yoshir-o, and his support remains concentrated there. Although he
has since renounced this factional affiliation, Koizumi has used his control
of the party leadership to favor his old colleagues. Over the last two years,
the LDP has contested elections in both houses of the Diet. Despite dis-
appointing performances for the party on both occasions, factions sup-
portive of Koizumi’s leadership and policies picked up seats while those in
opposition lost seats. Of particular note was the strong performance of the
Mori faction, the only major faction to pick up seats in both elections.
Koizumi’s intraparty opponents, concentrated in the Hashimoto and
Kamei factions, suffered mightily, losing seats in both elections. In the
end, the Mori faction reached near parity with the Hashimoto faction
(formerly the Tanaka faction) for the first time since this group was put
together by former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in the 1970s. Following
that lower house election, Kamei Shizuka, leader of the Kamei faction,
wondered out loud to reporters if Koizumi had dissolved the Diet for the
sole purpose of gaining seats for the Mori faction.65 The Mori faction’s con-
tinued success under Koizumi’s leadership also produced grumbling from
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the other factions following the party’s poor performance in the upper
house election.66
A side effect of this power play has been the consolidation of party
power in the hands of revisionists. And who are they today? They are
direct heirs of the traditional revisionist line––lit-
erally the sons and grandsons of Kishi Nobusuke
and his closest allies. Prime Minister Koizumi is
the scion of a distinguished line of the anti-main-
stream revisionists whose efforts to revise the
constitution had been thoroughly frustrated. The
prime minister’s father, Junya, became defense
minister in the early 1960s and Junichir-o’s first job in politics was as an
aide to one of his father’s like-minded colleagues and a future prime min-
ister, Fukuda Takeo. It is no mere coincidence, then, that on winning the
premiership Koizumi appointed Kishi’s grandson, Abe Shinz-o, as deputy
chief cabinet secretary (and later LDP secretary-general) and Fukuda’s son,
Fukuda Yasuo, as chief cabinet secretary. While by no means a carbon copy
of his father, Prime Minister Koizumi is the most pro-revision prime min-
ister in four decades. This was apparent right from the beginning when he
became the first prime minister since Kishi to refuse to endorse the con-
stitutional status quo when he took office in
April 2001. He has also given vocal support to
revisionists on numerous occasions—including
publicly toying with the idea of reinterpreting
Article Nine to allow for collective self-defense.67
And as we shall see, he has pushed policies that
have taken Japan right up to the edge of the 1954 interpretation and, some
say, beyond.
Two trends are apparent as this wedding of revisionist ambition with
stronger leadership affects the constitutional debate. First, support for
constitutional revision within the LDP has grown both in scale and scope
under Koizumi’s leadership. In a 1997 Yomiuri poll of Diet members, just
more than half of the LDP favored revising Article Nine. In 2002, nearly
nine in ten LDP parliamentarians were in favor of revision—and allowing
Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense.68 Second, as Koizumi
has increased his control during the LDP over the last three years, prag-
matists have increasingly lost out to revisionists within the party. Examples
are numerous. In 2002, Kat-o K-oichi was forced to resign his Diet seat in
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a scandal. A year later, Koizumi forced the retirement of Miyazawa Kiichi,
the arch-pragmatist and Yoshida disciple. Finally, just prior to the 2003
lower house election, Nonaka Hiromu, who had almost single-handedly
carried the pragmatist agenda through the Obuchi and Mori administra-
tions, announced his retirement from the Diet after expressing frustration
at the increasing power of the revisionist party leadership. Although Kat-o
has since been reelected, he and other prominent pragmatists, such as 
K-ono Y-ohei and Koga Makoto, are weaker than ever in party councils. The
consolidation of party power behind revisionist leadership has thus
worked to marginalize pragmatists and unify the LDP around revisionist
goals to an unprecedented degree.
As these internal changes were occurring within the LDP, external
events provided revisionists with further opportunities to challenge the
constitutional status quo. Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks
on New York and Washington, Prime Minister Koizumi took advantage of
his newly improved institutional and political position to craft a response
that surprised observers with both its speed and
the degree to which it pushed the envelope of
constitutional interpretation. One week after the
attacks, Koizumi announced a seven-point plan
featuring a clear pledge to dispatch the SDF to
assist U.S. operations against Taliban and Al
Qaeda forces.69 Legislation enacting this plan (the Antiterrorism Law)
passed the lower house less than one month later and became law before
the end of October. Among several other measures, the final law allowed
the dispatch of MSDF ships to the Indian Ocean to engage in medical,
transportation, and refueling activities in support of U.S. forces fighting in
Afghanistan. In comparison with the long and difficult deliberations that
ended in the failure of the UNPCC bill, the speed and scope of this
accomplishment are astonishing. They become more understandable,
however, when one considers how the institutional and political changes
described here combined to provide Koizumi with levers of power that
were not available to past prime ministers.
First, Koizumi was able to use the expanded crisis management capa-
bilities of the cabinet office to develop an initial response plan without
relying excessively on outside ministries or LDP party councils. In the
early hours after the attack, Koizumi made use of the Cabinet Crisis
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the situation a “serious emergency,” placing Chief Cabinet Secretary
Fukuda Yasuo in charge of managing related operations. Following a meet-
ing of the National Security Council the next morning, Koizumi took
advantage of his expanded ability to establish ad hoc offices by assigning
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Furukawa Teijir-o to establish a task force
to craft a response plan. In addition to members of the cabinet office, the
task force included selected senior officials from MOFA, JDA, and the
CLB. Furukawa also reassigned an existing Cabinet Secretariat study
group, originally created to consider emergency legislation, to provide the
technical expertise necessary to mold the task force’s decisions into draft
policies.70 In this way, by centralizing policymaking within the Cabinet
Secretariat, Koizumi was able to reduce interministerial conflict and speed
up the policymaking process. When a disagreement arose between MOFA
and the JDA over whether the SDF dispatch could be justified under the
existing guidelines, Koizumi was able to intervene decisively by ordering
the task force to draft new ad hoc legislation (Hughes 2002: 12–14). Thus
a major conflict was avoided and the process was entirely contained with-
in the Cabinet Secretariat.
Second, and perhaps more surprising, Koizumi was able to formulate
his initial plans without major consultations with his own party. Although
he consulted with LDP Secretary-General Yamasaki Taku early in the
process, this relationship was far different from the one that existed
between Prime Minister Kaifu and Secretary-General Ozawa during the
UNPCC debacle. In addition to his party position, Ozawa had also been
deputy head of the largest faction in the LDP at the time, whereas Kaifu
was from a small faction and thus needed Ozawa’s support to get his poli-
cies through the party. Koizumi, by contrast, had ignored factional affilia-
tion in his cabinet and party appointments: Yamasaki, although the leader
of a small faction, was better known as a close political ally of Koizumi.
Unlike Kaifu, Koizumi was also confident that his extremely high public
approval rating could be leveraged in pushing his plan through the LDP
party councils (Shinoda 2003: 30). The shift in the power balance between
the prime minister and his party is clear from the sequence of the policy
process. Before Koizumi presented his plan to the LDP General Council
on September 27, he had already held a press conference to announce its
main points, reached an agreement with his partners in the governing
coalition, and even briefed the opposition parties. The policy thus arrived
on the General Council’s doorstep largely as a fait accompli.
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And although Koizumi ended up making important concessions to 
K-omeit-o—including inserting a two-year sunset provision, banning the
transport of weapons, and requiring Diet approval for the deployment
plan—he made only minor compromises that can be directly traced to
demands emanating from within his own party. Chief among these was
the decision not to send destroyers equipped with the advanced Aegis fire
control system.71 This move was opposed by pragmatists such as Nonaka
Hiromu and Kat-o K-oichi, who saw it as unnecessarily provocative to
regional neighbors and worried that the ships’ ability to share target infor-
mation with U.S. forces might lead to a violation of the ban on collective
self-defense (Hughes 2002: 17–20). Finally, Koizumi also demonstrated
his control over his own cabinet by submitting the bill to the Diet from
the Cabinet Secretariat rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which
would normally handle Diet deliberations in this area. He was thus able to
assign the role of guiding the bill through the Diet to Chief Cabinet
Secretary Fukuda rather than the popular but eccentric Foreign Minister
Tanaka Makiko, whom he was not confident could effectively handle
questions on the bill (Shinoda 2004: 60).
Although the Antiterrorism Law applied constitutional logic similar
to that in the guidelines and PKO laws, the MSDF deployment was
authorized in a situation when Japan’s security was not directly threatened
and outside the auspices of a relevant UN peacekeeping operation. Its con-
stitutional justification combined something old with something new.
First, the government stressed the fact that the use of force was not sanc-
tioned to accomplish the mission—thus placing the deployment outside
the constraints of Article Nine, as was the case with “rear area support” in
the guidelines legislation (Hughes 2002: 20–21). Second, since the United
States had justified its attack on Afghanistan on self-defense grounds,
MSDF support for U.S. operations would seem to violate the ban on col-
lective self-defense. Here the Koizumi administration justified the deploy-
ment as a noncombat, collective security operation in accordance with
both the preamble of Japan’s constitution, which urges Japan “to strive for
the preservation of peace,” and UN Resolution 1368, which urges mem-
ber nations to cooperate against terrorist threats to international security
(Shinoda 2003: 31; Hughes 2002: 21–23). This reasoning, which echoed
ideas offered by an LDP committee chaired by Ozawa in 1992, opened a
new avenue for SDF dispatch while retaining the central constraint on the
use of force.72 In the end, the bill passed swiftly through the Diet and the
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SDF was dispatched to the Indian Ocean with the mandate to provide fuel
but little else to U.S. and British forces. Clearly the operation fell far short
of some revisionists’ hopes (Heginbotham and Samuels 2002b: 102).
Although the pragmatists and pacifists were again able to constrain
revisionists somewhat on this occasion, their ability to leverage each
other’s strength into significant revisionist concessions was on the decline.
This became apparent as Japan faced its next major external challenge: the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. At first, Japan’s response seemed consis-
tent with the pragmatist-pacifist line. Although the Koizumi government
offered diplomatic support for the United States in the face of domestic
opposition, it refused to join the wartime operations of the “coalition of
the willing.” Moreover, Koizumi cited Article Nine as the reason why
Japan could not provide combat troops. Following the end of major mili-
tary operations, however, revisionists began to push hard to send the SDF
to Iraq as part of Japan’s contribution to the reconstruction effort. As was
the case with the Antiterrorism Law, Koizumi again leveraged his institu-
tional and political position to craft an Iraq policy that challenged Article
Nine’s constraints more than ever before. This case is even more extraor-
dinary when one considers that Koizumi’s popularity had declined con-
siderably by this time (partly as a consequence of his Iraq War stance) and
the public was largely opposed to deploying the SDF in postwar Iraq.73
Despite facing new obstacles, Koizumi turned to the same methods he had
employed to pass the Antiterrorism Law. To the surprise of some, they
again produced results.
The first maneuver Koizumi reprised was the establishment of an ad
hoc office within the Cabinet Secretariat to coordinate Iraq policy. Within
this Iraq Response Team (Iraku Mondai Taisaku Honbu), which Koizumi
headed, a small group under Assistant Cabinet Secretary -Omori Keiji was
formed to develop a new law should an SDF deployment be pursued.74 By
the beginning of April, the group issued the opinion that existing UN res-
olutions were not sufficient justification to conduct an SDF deployment
under the PKO Law: a new law would be necessary to enable an Iraq oper-
ation. By early June, the group proposed that the new law should use exist-
ing UN resolutions (such as UN Resolution 1483) as the legal basis for
action, should restrict operations to “noncombat zones” (hisent-ochiiki),
and should avoid reviewing the use-of-force restrictions already in place in
order to ensure swift enactment (Shinoda 2004: 105).
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The second technique Koizumi again employed skillfully was in
sequencing the rollout of his plan in such a way as to reduce the influence
of the LDP policy councils. Once the bill’s framework had been deter-
mined, Koizumi and Fukuda first met with the secretary-generals of the
governing coalition parties to notify them of the government’s intention to
introduce the bill to the Diet. It was agreed at this meeting to add a four-
year sunset clause to the bill. Koizumi also asked for the cooperation of the
governing parties at a meeting of the government/ruling party liaison con-
ference (seifu yot -o renraku kaigi). The representatives of the Cabinet
Secretariat team then explained the bill (the Iraq Reconstruction Law) to
a joint session of two committees established between the LDP and 
K-omeit -o to discuss Iraq, North Korea, and terrorism issues.75 Only after
all this did the team present the bill to the relevant subcommittees of the
LDP Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) on June 10. After three days
of deliberations, a compromise was reached to leave the definition of “non-
combat zone” out of the bill. When the bill was subsequently presented to
the LDP General Affairs Council, pragmatists such as Nonaka again
fought to curtail its scope—this time successfully removing provisions
authorizing SDF participation in the disposal of weapons of mass destruc-
tion materials. The bill then received cabinet approval on June 16.76
Although the bill was opposed by all opposition parties—and some
prominent pragmatists, including Nonaka and Koga Makoto, abstained in
the lower house vote—it passed both houses of the Diet and became law
before the end of July.77
The speed with which this legislation was realized again bears com-
ment. It took only two months from Koizumi’s first public reference to the
possibility of sending the SDF on May 21 to the passage of the Iraq
Reconstruction Law on July 26. Keeping debate to a minimum, Koizumi
and his allies had again pushed a bill through
the Diet authorizing an SDF deployment.
Facing a lower house election in November
and growing violence on the ground in Iraq,
however, Koizumi delayed the deployment
plan for months. His cabinet finally
approved an action plan in mid-December,
and deployment of a 1,000-man force was
completed in spring 2004. Japanese forces have now been in Samawah for
over a year and have already seen their tour of duty extended by the Diet
it is hard to understand
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once. Whereas other U.S. allies have come to Iraq, shown the flag, and
departed, the SDF has stayed for the duration. With armed Japanese troops
remaining on the ground in a hostile environment and with the Koizumi
government implementing a kind of de facto collective self-defense, it is
hard to understand this as anything short of a turning point in Japan’s post-
war security policy.
In developing and implementing Japan’s Iraq policy, Koizumi and his
revisionist allies took actions that at first reaffirmed and then ignored
Article Nine. During the lead-up to the Iraq War, the Koizumi adminis-
tration cited Article Nine to justify Japan’s refusal to send combat troops.
Following the end of major hostilities, however, Koizumi and JDA head
Ishiba Shigeru pushed hard for a human contribution to the postwar
reconstruction, emphasizing the ineffectiveness of Japan’s “checkbook
diplomacy” during the first Gulf War. Although their plan included an
SDF deployment, they argued it was consistent with Article Nine since the
troops would not be allowed to use force to accomplish their mission and
Iraq was no longer a “combat zone” (sent -ochiiki). But as the security situ-
ation in Iraq deteriorated during the late summer and fall of 2003, this
second assertion became increasingly problematic. Nonetheless, despite
the admission by both the United States military and Japanese survey mis-
sions that an armed insurgency was under way, Koizumi continued to
argue that Article Nine’s prohibitions were not relevant to the planned
SDF mission. On the day he announced cabinet approval of the deploy-
ment, Koizumi avoided mention of Article Nine at all. This strategy
seemed designed to avoid legal and political complications. On the legal
side, Koizumi’s claim not to be challenging past interpretations of Article
Nine allowed him to avoid further legalistic wrangling with the CLB.
Politically this strategy seemed aimed at maintaining support for the
deployment among advocates of Article Nine in the governing coalition,
including the K-omeit-o and LDP pragmatists, who had begun to express
doubts about the SDF’s mission. In addition, ignoring the policy’s Article
Nine implications also reduced the ability of the DPJ, which opposed the
deployment, to exploit the constitutional issue. Whether this strategy will
work in the long run remains to be seen, but it has produced a glaring
inconsistency between the government’s protestations of support for past
Article Nine interpretations and its actual policy initiatives.
Considering these developments, one must wonder how Article Nine
has so far survived the Koizumi administration. The answer again lies in
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the shifting institutional bases of the revisionists, pragmatists, and paci-
fists––this time the presence of K-omeit-o in the ruling coalition. Thus the
weakened pragmatists have been able to leverage the pacifist vote in coali-
tion councils and moderate revisionist demands. In this way, the numer-
ical decline among pacifists and pragmatists has been somewhat compen-
sated for by the requirements of coalition politics. This is one reason why
Article Nine remained on the books. But another factor was also at work.
Over the last fifteen years, Article Nine has been used by pragmatists and
revisionists alike to keep Japan from contributing combat forces to the
Gulf War, the Afghanistan conflict, and even hypothetical contingencies
in surrounding areas that might impact upon Japan’s own security.
Indeed, Article Nine was invoked by Koizumi himself when, faced with
an uncertain economy and a militarily assertive alliance partner, he
refused to contribute combat forces for the invasion of Iraq. Although
Japan eventually did deploy the SDF on a humanitarian mission, combat
remains off the table. This stance was affirmed when Chief Cabinet
Secretary Hosoda Hiroyuki mused publicly that the outbreak of violence
in Samawah could lead to the withdrawal of Japanese forces.78 The lesson
here is that one should never underestimate the value of Article Nine as a
tool of alliance management.
Despite continuing to play the Article Nine card, revisionists remain
publicly committed to realizing formal change in the future and have
developed strategies to avoid bureaucratic and political resistance to infor-
mal change as well. The balance of power within the conservative majori-
ty is shifting at last. The LDP is now headed by revisionist leaders who
openly champion a stronger posture for Japan in international affairs, and
the party is becoming more unified on key issues in the constitutional
debate, including revising Article Nine. Five decades of tripartite political
dynamics among pacifists, revisionists, and pragmatists may finally be
changing in ways that alter the dynamics of constitutional politics that
protected Article Nine so well.
The central obstacle to change, the pragmatist/pacifist coalition, has
been greatly weakened. Although pragmatists and pacifists remain on the
scene, their power to keep constitutional revision from the political agen-
da is gone. It was this power that kept the revisionists from taking their
case to the people. The major fault line of postwar politics has thus shift-
ed. And as a result, the document that gave power to the Japanese people
is now available for their reconsideration for the first time in 50 years. No
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matter how the current debate over Article Nine concludes, this develop-
ment is itself nothing less than a turning point for Japanese democracy.
Japan may not yet have become a “normal nation” with this change, but it
is certainly becoming a more normal democracy.
Whither Article Nine?
Can Article Nine survive in this new environment? Recent developments
give the impression that change is in the works. First, as noted earlier, revi-
sionists are firmly in control of the LDP. Polls taken before the recent Diet
elections consistently showed that nearly nine out of ten LDP candidates
favored constitutional revision.79 What is
more, a poll of the candidates contesting the
2004 upper house election found that 88
percent of LDP candidates favored revising
Article Nine, while 78 percent agreed that
Japan should be allowed to exercise the right of collective self-defense.80
Koizumi may have declared that constitutional revision will not happen
during his tenure as prime minister, but he has set his party on an overtly
revisionist trajectory. In 2004 he announced that the LDP would unveil
an official constitutional revision proposal in time for the party’s fiftieth
anniversary in November 2005. Despite long years of revisionist agitation,
the LDP has never unified behind a specific revision proposal. This will
likely change when the newly established LDP New Constitution Drafting
Committee (Jimint-o Shinkenp -o Kis-o Iinkai), chaired by key Koizumi ally
Mori Yoshir-o, completes its work and issues a proposal to the party lead-
ership later this year. Based on preliminary drafts made public in April and
July 2005, it appears this proposal will call for revising Article Nine.81
There are other auspicious signs. First, opinion in the Diet has swung
decisively in favor of constitutional revision. A March 2004 Yomiuri poll
of lower house parliamentarians found that eight in ten supported for-
mally amending the constitution.82 Other polls have shown similar levels
of Diet enthusiasm.83 Although this does not necessarily translate into
enthusiasm for changing Article Nine, it does appear to be easing the way
for change in general. For example, one long-standing problem for revi-
sionists has been the lack of formal procedures to govern the revision
process.84 Although revisionists have tried on three past occasions to enact
legislation clarifying such procedures, they have never succeeded.85 In
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2001, a suprapartisan group of Diet members pushing for constitutional
revision prepared draft bills for these procedures, but K-omeit-o opposed
moving forward on the legislation and a 2002 Yomiuri poll found only a
plurality (49 percent) of Diet members in favor of establishing a revision
procedure.86 By 2004, however, things had changed. In March, Yomiuri
found that nearly nine in ten lower house members approved of establish-
ing amendment procedures.87 The LDP developed a new draft of the bills
in December 2004, and K-omeit-o agreed to drop its objections in February
2005.88 The coalition partners are now in negotiations with the DPJ to
empower the constitutional research commissions, whose original tenures
expired in April 2005, with the authority to deliberate over the draft bills.
Although the original goal was to have a procedure in place by June and
newspaper editorialists have demanded prompt action on the matter, the
LDP may push the final vote off until the end of the year or perhaps early
2006.89 Still, for those who have waited half a century, a few more months
are not likely to dampen their spirits.
Second, the DPJ and K-omeit-o have begun to show support for the
revisionist project in other ways. The DPJ set up a party committee to
develop its own revision proposal. The committee released an interim
report in June 2004 that called for changes to Article Nine—including
allowing Japan to use force in collective security operations provided an
appropriate United Nations resolution is passed. Restricting Japan’s use of
force overseas to UN collective security operations has long been cham-
pioned by Ozawa Icir-o, who, following the merger of the DPJ with his
Liberal Party in 2003, brought his revisionist energy and vision to the
largest opposition party. The DPJ is scheduled to arrive at a final propos-
al by 2006. K-omeit -o, in addition to dropping its opposition to the revi-
sion procedure bills, has also signaled a willingness to support specific
constitutional amendments favored by other parties, particularly the
expansion of the rights of citizens. K-omeit-o support for some amend-
ments is significant, since it creates the possibility for constitutional
horse-trading in the future. The public, too, appears amenable to consti-
tutional change. Public opinion polls taken in 2004 show that a majority
of the Japanese public favors revising the constitution and that support
for constitutional change has been increasing for a decade.90
In April 2005, the constitutional research commissions of both Diet
houses released their final reports. The lower house panel produced
“majority opinions” (tas-u iken) on several issues related to Article Nine—
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including specifying in the constitution the right of self-defense, the con-
stitutional place of the SDF, and a role for the SDF in United Nations
collective security operations.91 But the commission divided three ways
over the thorny issue of allowing the exer-
cise of collective self-defense, with roughly
equal numbers supporting allowing its
unrestricted exercise, permitting its exercise
only with restrictions, and maintaining the
existing ban. In addition, those in favor of
allowing collective self-defense differed over
whether or not it was necessary to make
explicit reference to the right in the consti-
tution.92 More problematic for revisionists
was the upper house report. Although favorable to constitutional revision
in some areas, such as the inclusion of new individual rights, the upper
house panel was unable to reach a consensus on changes to Article Nine.
In the end, the only Article Nine issue the majority in both panels agreed
on was a nonchange: maintaining the first paragraph intact.93 Pro-revision
editorialists could not hide their disappointment with this mixed result.94
Thus although the Diet commissions identified some points of agreement
among the major parties, their ultimate failure to reach consensus on
many of the central issues of the Article Nine debate underscores the chal-
lenges still facing revisionists.
These challenges are both institutional and political. Perhaps the most
serious obstacle is the fact that the governing coalition is divided over the
Article Nine question. K-omeit-o strongly supports maintaining Article
Nine in its present form. The majority within the party (as expressed in its
October 2004 action plan) opposes specific changes to Article Nine’s two
paragraphs and affirms the government interpretation that Japan cannot
use force in collective self-defense.95
Accordingly, K-omeit-o itself is a hotbed of
opposition to changing Article Nine. In a
2004 poll of candidates contesting the upper
house election, K-omeit-o candidates over-
whelmingly opposed revising Article Nine
(71 percent) and the notion that Japan should be able to exercise the right
of collective self-defense (86 percent).96 Party president Kanzaki Takenori
has stated clearly that K-omeit-o will leave the governing coalition if the
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LDP chooses to pursue constitutional changes with which his party dis-
agrees.97 This threat is not an idle one. Recent elections have enhanced 
K-omeit-o’s position within the coalition. In 2004, the LDP was unable to
take back a majority in the House of Councilors and thus must continue
to rely on K-omeit-o to get legislation through the chamber. More impor-
tant, the LDP has become highly dependent on K-omeit-o to deliver S-oka
Gakkai voters to the polls in support of LDP candidates for lower house
single seat constituencies. According to one analysis, the LDP would have
lost 81 seats in the 2003 election in the absence of K-omeit-o support.98
With the DPJ close on its heels in both houses of the Diet, the LDP can
ill afford to alienate such a useful partner. K-omeit-o has worked hard over
the past five years to moderate the LDP’s revisionist ambitions, and seems
likely to continue to do so.
Moreover the LDP, while united to an unprecedented degree over
constitutional revision, remains divided on some of the specifics of its own
Article Nine strategy. Although the LDP draft proposal leaked to the press
in November 2004 argued that the right of collective self-defense should
be recognized without restriction, this position is not universally held
within the party. In particular, there is concern that such recognition may
result in Japan being drawn by the United States into distant conflicts with
little relation to Japan’s national interests.99 Yamasaki Taku, a former LDP
secretary-general and staunch supporter of collective self-defense rights,
gave voice to this fear in June 2002: 
[By enacting my proposal for revising Article Nine], the right of col-
lective self-defense will become constitutionally recognized. But from
a security point of view, I wonder if it would be better to restrict the exer-
cise of this right, such as by limiting it to emergency contingencies in
areas surrounding Japan that have a serious impact on Japan’s peace
and stability. A hard-line concept, such as fighting together with the
United States to the four corners of the earth, should not be adopted.100
To address this concern, some have suggested that only restricted forms of
collective self-defense should be allowed. One such scheme would limit
Japan’s exercise of collective self-defense to cases in which the United
States, Japan’s only military ally, is attacked by another state. Since the
world’s only superpower is unlikely to be challenged in this way in the near
future, Article Nine so revised would maintain much of its value as a hedg-
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ing instrument.101 Other proposals would attach restrictions to the exercise
of collective self-defense at the subconstitutional level, perhaps in the form
of a basic defense law.102 This would convert the debate over restrictions
from a constitutional matter to normal Diet business, likely increasing
flexibility in security policymaking. As the LDP prepares its revision pro-
posal, it will have to resolve these disagreements.
And revisionists will not be able to count on Koizumi’s leadership for
much longer. His current term as LDP president expires in September
2006. Unless party rules are changed, he will have to step down as prime
minister at that time. In addition, with his popularity rating falling below
50 percent (and reaching an all-time low of 33 percent in January 2005),
Koizumi has become more vulnerable to challenges from within his own
party.103 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, he has expended enor-
mous amounts of political capital in a bruising fight over reforming the
postal savings system. The degree to which he will be able to push the
constitutional revision debate forward in the twilight of his tenure is thus
in question.
And, there are other hurdles. Revisionists in the LDP will have to
reach out to like-minded members of the DPJ in order to achieve the nec-
essary two-thirds majority. Koizumi has already publicly appealed for
cooperation on constitutional reform from the opposition parties. The
DPJ, however, may not be a suitable partner for the LDP. First, the
Democrats have their own ideas about how
to revise the constitution in general and
Article Nine in particular. As noted earlier,
the June 2004 DPJ proposal for changing Article Nine required a United
Nations resolution for Japan to be allowed to use force for collective secu-
rity.104 Including such a bright-line distinction in the constitution is at
odds with current LDP thinking in both style and substance. Whether a
compromise can be reached is not clear. Second, the DPJ cannot be
expected to cooperate with the LDP without major concessions. They
have slowly built up their Diet strength through electoral successes and
party mergers and now stand within striking distance of becoming the
ruling party. As Japanese politics has moved toward a two-party system,
the calculus of compromise has shifted. With the Democrats so close to a
breakthrough, they will not so easily hand the LDP a victory on an issue
as prominent as constitutional revision.
And, there are other hurdles 
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Third, the Democrats are themselves split on the issue. The largest
opposition party is a mixture of veteran politicians who switched parties
and younger politicians who came into politics as Democrats. Among the
veterans, Yokomichi’s group of pacifists continues to restrain and divide
the party over Article Nine.105 In a 2004 poll of upper house candidates,
DPJ members opposed revising Article Nine by a narrow margin (40 per-
cent to 34 percent) but a solid majority (54 percent to 20 percent)
opposed allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.106 In
addition, the fact that the DPJ opposed the Iraq deployment on constitu-
tional grounds suggests two possibilities: either the DPJ will continue to
exploit this issue as the events of the deployment unfold––a strategy that
would further complicate cooperation with the LDP on Article Nine revi-
sion––or it will split. Indeed, we should not be surprised if either the DPJ
or the LDP splinters over this issue. Perhaps both will.
If the revisionists can navigate these obstacles, one last challenge will
remain: convincing the Japanese electorate that Article Nine should be
changed. Public opinion is far more enthusiastic about constitutional revi-
sion in general than it is about changing Article Nine. In fact, in most
polls, a majority of the public opposes revising Article Nine, although
support for change has risen in recent years.107 Moreover the public is
deeply divided over collective self-defense.108 The upshot is that although
recent changes are trending the revisionists’ way, public opinion remains
opposed to revising Article Nine. 
But the world is not standing still. With Japanese soldiers in harm’s
way half a world away, external events may overtake the slow-moving con-
stitutional revision debate. If the SDF suffers casualties in Iraq, all sides
will attempt to use them to support their position on Article Nine. How
the public would respond is hard to predict. Similarly, one can imagine
several regional crises that might have a major impact on Article Nine’s
future. The Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Straits come immediately to
the fore. In the case of the former, a North Korean nuclear test would
stimulate considerable support for the revisionist position, but it is not at
all clear that a preemptive strike by the United States on the Yongbyon
reactor would generate support for the alliance––or for changes to Article
Nine. The Taiwan case is equally problematic. Now that Japan has pub-
licly included the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Straits issue among the
list of “common strategic objectives” it shares with the U.S., a crisis there
could push the Article Nine debate in different directions. A crisis precip-
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itated by a Taiwanese declaration of independence would likely give the
Japanese pause about the wisdom of government policy and could derail
constitutional revision. One precipitated by another miscalculation by
Beijing would likely be met with an accelerated revision of Article Nine.
With these remaining difficulties looming large, one might expect
revisionists to give up on the grand project of constitutional revision and
return to the tried-and-true method of reinterpretation. Several prominent
politicians have in fact called for changing the interpretation to allow col-
lective self-defense.109 Immediately after taking
office, Prime Minister Koizumi publicly consid-
ered formally enabling collective self-defense
through reinterpretation but later abandoned the
idea.110 His decision was likely driven by several
factors. First, revisionists believe they are closer
to their goal than at any time in decades. Many
politicians support revision because they think
Japan should be able to exercise the same rights
as other nations. If a reinterpretation were to resolve the long-standing dis-
pute over collective self-defense, the entire revisionist movement would
likely lose steam.111 
Second, such a major change would not be on the same scale as past
reinterpretations. Following the government interpretation in 1954,
changes have come in the form of ever finer specifications of that inter-
pretation’s borders—defining such concepts as “offensive weapons” and
“overseas deployment” as well as introducing such distinctions as “becom-
ing one” with an attacker’s force. Although the effect may have been to
weaken the relevant constraint, none of these changes directly challenged
the core of the 1954 interpretation—that Japan is limited in its use of
force in ways that other countries are not. Issuing a reinterpretation allow-
ing collective self-defense would in effect overthrow the 1954 interpreta-
tion, contradicting half a century of government policies. Revisionists
would then not only have to justify this move to the public but would also
have to reconcile it with the past actions of their own leadership.
Koizumi, for example, has pointed to Article Nine as the reason Japan
could not provide troops for major combat operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq. How could he explain to Japanese allies and neighbors that these
past decisions, along with five decades of LDP insistence that Japan could
not engage in collective self-defense, were based on a mistaken interpre-
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tation of the constitution? Not only would this move look like a flagrant
violation of the rule of law to domestic audiences, it would also compli-
cate Japan’s foreign relations.
Third, revisionists are well aware that reinterpretations, while easier to
realize than amendments, are also more easily reversed. A future cabinet
could simply return to the 1954 interpretation—or, worse, something
more restrictive. With the DPJ vying for control of the Diet, the LDP is
reluctant to give them such a controversial issue to use in the next election.
In addition, such a radical reinterpretation would almost certainly prompt
K-omeit-o to leave the ruling coalition, a blow that would cause the LDP
serious legislative and electoral headaches. Fourth, and finally, there is lit-
tle reason to expend political capital on reinterpretation when revision is
in sight. Lacking both the legitimacy-building features (Diet votes, nation-
al referendum, and the like) and the institutional stickiness of formal
amendment––and given a relatively elastic status quo––reinterpretation is
thus not the favored solution for contemporary revisionists. If change is to
come, it is likely to be in the form of constitutional revision.
As is the case with any political contest, the final outcome of the
Article Nine debate will depend a great deal on the strategies chosen by
participants. One important aspect of the strategies employed by those
pushing to change Article Nine involves their treatment of other parts of
the constitution. The fight over Article Nine is not taking place in a vac-
uum. It is only one issue, albeit a central one, in a wider debate over how
the constitution should be changed. The major parties have all proposed
revisions of various kinds. The LDP has so far been the most ambitious,
calling for a complete rewriting (zenmen
kaitei) that would reorder the entire docu-
ment and include numerous changes and
additions. This strategy, which was pursued
by revisionists in the 1950s, apparently
stems from two concerns. First, many con-
servatives still bristle that the current constitution is “U.S.-imposed” and
blame it for what they see as the excessive individualism of contemporary
Japanese society. For them, revision is an opportunity to redefine the
nation and its values. Second, adopting an expansive approach allows revi-
sionists to package less popular revisions, such as changes to Article Nine,
with widely supported changes, such as the addition of new individual
rights (Watanabe 2002: 45–50). In this view, putting more of the consti-
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tution on the table may increase the ability of revisionists to link issues and
horse-trade in the Diet while adding an attractive gloss to the revisionist
project in the eyes of the public. A review of the LDP’s November 2004
proposal shows this strategy at work. In addition to the significant changes
to Article Nine discussed here, the proposal calls for major reforms in
other categories. Importantly, the proposal calls for the establishment of
new rights, including the right to personal privacy and the “right to know”
(the right to access information from government organizations). These
new rights are supported by both the DPJ and K-omeit-o and are also pop-
ular with the public.
These new individual rights may have been included as bargaining
chips to allow the LDP to reach compromises on its less popular reforms.
This would seem a sound strategy if Article Nine were the only contro-
versial item on the LDP’s constitutional agenda. It is not. The November
proposal also addresses a wish list long held by LDP conservatives who
think the current constitution has damaged Japan’s traditional sense of
national identity and social values. Reforms suggested in this area includ-
ed reinstating the emperor as head of state (genshu), albeit one with no
political power; incorporating language about patriotism (aikokushin) in
the preamble; and adding duties (gimu or sekimu) to the citizenry, includ-
ing the duty to defend the country. These reforms have been roundly crit-
icized as “reactionary” by newspaper editorials and are not supported by
the other major parties.112 Not surprisingly, a recent Asahi poll found very
little support for them among the public.113
Although the LDP revision proposal has yet to be finalized, internal
preparations indicate movement toward a more accommodating stance.
The LDP working draft circulated in November 2004 included several ele-
ments—such as provisions specifying Japan’s nonnuclear policy and an
explicit ban on conscription—that seem designed to appeal to the public
and opposition parties. Although an outline prepared in April 2005 by a
new committee established in mid-December by Prime Minister Koizumi
and chaired by Mori Yoshir-o unceremoniously dropped the nonnuclear
language, it studiously avoided explicit recognition of the right of collec-
tive self-defense, opting instead to acknowledge the more general right of
“jiei” (self-defense). This language remained intact when the Mori com-
mittee made public an updated version of the outline in early July.114 The
move appears designed to appeal to pragmatists within the party as well as
to pacifists in K-omeit-o who are opposed to openly allowing collective self-
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defense. According to this strategy, once the “jiei” language has been added
to the constitution, the issue of the recognition of the right of collective
self-defense and the parameters of its exercise could be handled at a later
date through interpretation and the passage of a basic defense law.115 This
outcome, however, would be ironic in the sense that revisionists who have
long complained about using interpretation to affect constitutional change
would in essence be creating the conditions for a future round of struggles
over interpretation. In fact, any amendment that fails to specify the right
of collective self-defense will almost certainly touch off a new era of con-
stitutional governance through interpretation. Although such an outcome
would likely end in some form of collective self-defense being recognized,
continued conflict over this issue would be all but assured.
The July draft was more accommodating in other areas as well. For
example, although the April draft specified a citizen’s duty to defend the
country (which might provide a legal justification for conscription), the
July draft downgraded this controversial and politically unwise measure to
a list of matters requiring “further discussion.” In addition, the issue of
whether to specify the Emperor as “head of state” (genshu), which res-
onates negatively among many Japanese as a reactionary nod to the prewar
emperor system, was dropped completely from the July draft. Provided
neither issue resurfaces in later LDP proposals, these changes are clear
steps forward for the revision movement. One lesson from revisionists’
failure in the 1950s was that the appearance of reactionary intentions has
the potential to mobilize large cross-sections of the public against the
entire revision project. A successful revision strategy would thus do well to
steer clear of such measures.
Despite these compromises, however, the July outline is a deeply con-
servative document. The introduction of new rights, which were included
in previous proposals, was set aside for further debate. In addition, the July
outline retained language that in effect broadens the circumstances under
which the government may abridge the basic rights of citizens. Currently
the constitution limits basic freedoms such as those of speech and assem-
bly only to the extent that they interfere with the “public welfare” (k-oky-o
no fukushi). While the November draft expanded this exception by replac-
ing “public welfare” with the vague “public values” (k-oky-o no kachi), the
April draft went even further—suggesting that basic rights may be
abridged for a variety of reasons including the pursuit of the “public inter-
est” (k -oeki) or the strengthening of “public order” (-oyake no chitsujo). This
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provision remained unchanged in the July draft. The drive to limit basic
freedoms may prove problematic for the revision movement if it appears
in the final LDP proposal. Although establishing a strong initial negotiat-
ing position is an important concern for the LDP, limiting basic freedoms
is a nonstarter that will allow opponents to demonize the process as anti-
democratic. Its retention in the November LDP proposal would reduce
the chances of successful revision.
A second important strategic issue for revisionists involves the crafting
of the revision procedure bills. Negotiations are ongoing to invest the Diet
constitutional research commissions with the power to consider this legis-
lation. In addition to measures to cover debate in the Diet, a law estab-
lishing the national referendum must also be passed. Although there are
many issues at stake in setting up these procedures, revisionists may pur-
sue two basic strategies. They may try to establish a system in which
amendments to multiple articles may be considered simultaneously and
voted up or down with a single vote or one in which multiple amendments
are considered, and voted on, one at a time. The former approach would
coincide with the zenmen kaitei strategy described earlier, and there are
signs the LDP may prefer this position. When a coalition government
committee chaired by the head of the LDP constitution research commit-
tee drafted a proposal for a national referendum law in December 2004, it
left open the possibility that multiple amendments might be bundled
together in a single vote.116 This strategy contrasts with an April 2005 pro-
posal put forth by the DPJ that explicitly called for citizens to be given the
opportunity to vote separately on different proposed amendments.117
In our view, adopting a procedure in which changes to multiple arti-
cles are determined in a single vote will ultimately be counterproductive
for the revisionists. First, the risk-averse Japanese electorate will likely balk
if given a single vote on changes as diverse as the language of the pream-
ble, duties and rights of the citizen, the role of the emperor, and Article
Nine. Second, this procedure would create a powerful temptation for con-
servatives to pursue long-held (but wildly unpopular) goals such as limit-
ing basic freedoms. This strategy is thus likely to generate opponents both
in the Diet and among the public. Allowing parliamentarians and the pub-
lic to assess changes on an article-by-article (or least topic-by-topic) basis
is both more likely to succeed and better for Japanese democracy. It would
engender less widespread opposition, reduce the public’s suspicion of the
process, and allow for a clearer and more accessible public debate. The
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demands of this procedure would also likely moderate revision propos-
als—eliminating radical positions with little chance of passage at an early
stage. In sum, then, the initial strategic decisions made by revisionists will
be vital to the eventual success of the process and may be viewed as indi-
cators of the likelihood of change.
So what is going to happen? Reliable methods of predicting major
institutional change have so far eluded social science. With all the appro-
priate caveats, the Article Nine debate has
four possible outcomes. First, it seems likely
that any change will at least formalize the
informal status quo. All major parties and
the public agree that Japan has the right to defend itself and may maintain
the SDF for this purpose. K-omeit-o has argued that making these points
explicit is unnecessary, but both the LDP and the DPJ support adding lan-
guage clarifying the SDF’s role and the nation’s right to self-defense.
Although this change would simply elevate the 1954 interpretation to
constitutional status, it might be used to break the taboo associated with
revision and Article Nine, paving the way for more extensive changes in
the future. And this revision may have a particular appeal in Japanese pol-
itics, since it is in effect a face-saving way to paint the status quo with the
brush of reform.
A second likelihood is that the major parties will reach an agreement
on allowing a restricted form of collective self-defense. An Article Nine
revised in this way would recognize the right of individual self-defense and
some limited form of collective self-defense linked to the U.S.-Japan
alliance, to the United Nations, or both. The key event in this scenario
would be a compromise between the LDP and the DPJ over how to
restrict collective self-defense. If such an agreement could be reached, and
the conditions were sufficiently restrictive, it seems possible that even 
K-omeit-o might sign on. A grand compromise of this proportion would
also ease the measure’s passage in the national referendum.
The third and least likely possibility is the formal recognition of the
right of collective self-defense without any specific limitations. Although
the LDP proposal for Article Nine is currently in this form, it will be inter-
esting to see if it survives intact in the party’s final draft. Considering the
amount of debate within the party, the level of incongruence with the
positions of K-omeit-o and DPJ, and the public’s misgivings on this issue,
this proposal seems unlikely to overcome the opposition it faces. Its best
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chance of passage would involve making major concessions by adding
restrictions to a relevant subconstitutional law, such as a new basic defense
law. Although this law would be easier to change, the operational result, at
least for the time being, would be the same.
It should also be noted that the possibility of complete failure contin-
ues to loom over the entire project. The institutional requirements are
high and the Diet and the public are anything but united on the key
issues. The current revision movement may well fail in the Diet—either
because of the failure to reach a consensus on draft language or a dis-
agreement about which revision strategy to employ. Nevertheless we
observe an encouraging irony for democracy in Japan. In the past, the key
obstacles to revising Article Nine were pragmatists in the LDP, pacifists in
the opposition, and a divided public. If pragmatism and pacifism contin-
ue to decline in the Diet, the role of the public will become greater than
ever. If the public continues to oppose major changes in Article Nine, the
electorate may remain an important force in the constitutional debate.
Thus while the final outcome remains uncertain, two aspects of the
process are very certain indeed. First, Article Nine’s future will be as con-
tested as its past. And second, the constitutional debate is shaping up to
become a major test for Japanese democracy—one that the Japanese peo-
ple have given every indication of passing with flying colors.  
And, finally, there is always the possibility of new group formation.
One such possibility is the development of a Gaullist movement seeking
to revise Article Nine in concert with an expansion of Japanese defensive
capabilities outside the confines of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Although some
polls show a cooling of public opinion toward the alliance and many sen-
ior politicians see strengthening ties with regional partners as a means of
enhancing Japan’s position vis-à-vis the United States, there is little evi-
dence to suggest broad-based support for a radical break in security policy
at this time (Heginbotham and Samuels 2002a: 119). This is not to say
that anti-American sentiments are unheard of in the halls of the Diet or
that there are no areas of divergence in U.S. and Japanese foreign policy
preferences. There were strong anti-American undercurrents in the DPJ
critique of Koizumi’s response to the Iraq War, and LDP backbenchers
sometimes share these sentiments. Likewise preferences on how to deal
with Tehran—like preferences on how to deal with Pyongyang—have
been subject to intense debate between Tokyo and Washington. Neither
these views nor these divergences have challenged the mainstream of the
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revisionist movement, however, which continues to operate under the
assumption of a robust alliance.
Implications
If Article Nine is revised to allow for collective self-defense, it will certain-
ly have major implications for Japan, the United States, and the East Asian
region. Domestically the road to collective self-defense may touch off
another round of political realignment with both the LDP and the DPJ
splitting and reforming along pro-revision and anti-revision lines. Or it
may result in a grand compromise that unifies all major parties and her-
alds a new era of Japanese politics in which the central cleavage shifts from
foreign to domestic policy. Either way, it is hard to imagine how such an
accomplishment would not shake up the Japanese political world for years
to come.
The impact on U.S.-Japan relations will depend a great deal on the
details of the revision. The United States has abandoned its Cold War
“dual containment” approach to its alliance with Japan. Since the first
Gulf War, the United States has increased pressure on Japan to make more
substantive contributions to the alliance. Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage reportedly suggested in mid-2004 that Article Nine
was an obstacle to Japanese membership on
the UN Security Council.118 It seems clear
the United States would like to see Japan
free from the present restraints of Article
Nine. Yet the old adage about being careful
what one wishes for could easily apply here.
For example, if Article Nine is revised but
new restrictions continue to keep Japan from providing troops for future
U.S.-led “coalitions of the willing,” relations may suffer more than if no
constitutional change occurred at all. At present, Japanese administrations
may make the plausible claim that Article Nine ties their hands. This
claim loses much of its force, however, once Article Nine has been revised
in a way that still fails to allow Japan to fight shoulder to shoulder with
its key ally.
Still worse, the United States may have to face the eventuality of a
Japan constitutionally capable of providing combat forces but politically
unwilling to do so. The example of Germany is instructive in this regard.
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In 1991, West Germany pointed to constitutional constraints to avoid
participating in combat operations in Iraq (although it offered other forms
of support). During the mid-1990s, the German Constitutional Court
ruled that military operations outside the North American Treaty
Organization (NATO) area were constitutional (Itoh 1998: 167–68).
Germany then provided combat forces for the war in Kosovo and, more
recently, has played a large role in the occupation of Afghanistan. The
German refusal to contribute forces for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in
2003, however, placed intense strain on the alliance that is still playing
out. Politicians in the United States have demonized German leaders;
alliance relations deteriorated to the lowest level in twenty years (and per-
haps ever); and plans for shifting U.S. bases out of Germany are in the off-
ing. By comparison, Japan participated in none of the above conflicts and
has paid little price in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Although
Japan’s noncombat participation in the postwar occupation of Iraq has
provided “boots on the ground,” the fact remains that Japan refused to
bleed with the United States against Iraq’s armies. Even so, commentators
agree that U.S.-Japan relations have never been better, while the news of
President Bush’s recent trip to Europe was all about “reconciliation” and
trying to “repair the damage” to the transatlantic alliance. 
In short, saying no because one can’t and saying no because one won’t
are not the same thing and can have different consequences for alliance
relations. In Japan’s case, there is a particularly large difference between a
refusal based on a U.S.-imposed constitutional provision dripped in trag-
ic history and a refusal resulting from an active choice. Thus, almost par-
adoxically, U.S.-Japan relations may well worsen if major changes are
made to Article Nine. In any event, Japan will remain the junior partner
in the alliance and will need to find new ways to hedge the dual risks of
entrapment and abandonment.
Japan’s regional relations are likely to suffer in the wake of any Article
Nine revision. South Koreans are none too happy with the proposed
change but––sandwiched as they are between China and the U.S.-Japan
alliance––are likely to resign themselves to it. Still, media commentaries
on the LDP November draft were provocative. Yonhap Television News
said that if the Japanese constitution is revised, “Japan will be armed with
military power and begin marching toward becoming a great military
power.”119 Munhwa Ilbo called the LDP draft “shocking” and worried that
by revising the constitution Japan would join the ranks of great military
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powers such as the United States, China, and Russia. And one commen-
tator from the moderate Chungang Ilbo was even more blunt: “For the
past 60 years, Japan wasn’t really its true self. It was constrained by the bri-
dle of defeat under the peace constitution. However, we will see the real
Japan soon.”120 There is thus the possibility that South Korea would use a
major revision of Article Nine to justify a more friendly posture toward
China or perhaps, at the least, a more independent stance toward the
United States and Japan. In either case, Japan would clearly have some
diplomacy ahead of it.
China’s reaction certainly was predictable. Many in Beijing will find
this change very provocative––and not for no reason. Xinhua News
Agency declared that the LDP draft
is a signal that warrants the vigilance of the world, especially various
Asian countries that were invaded by Japan in the past. . . .  Japan is
daydreaming to materialize its wild ambitions of becoming a political
and military power. Japan will then definitely pose a serious threat to
peace in Asia and the world. In the future, it is absolutely possible for
a country that has been unable and unwilling to admit its past history
of invading other countries to repeat its historic mistakes. Once Japan
has broken through the restrictions stipulated in the peaceful consti-
tution, Japan’s “self-defense military force” will freely go to various
places around the world and wantonly launch “preemptive” strikes on
its so-called enemies. Such a scenario can only make the peoples of
various Asian countries that previously suffered the cruel oppression of
Japanese militarists maintain their heightened vigilance.121
The questions are how Beijing—now Japan’s largest trading partner—
will use a Japanese constitutional change, for how long, and at what cost?
Surely it will be a tool for anti-Japanese public diplomacy. Likewise, it is a
good bet that Beijing will continue to use it to denounce Tokyo to help
consolidate power at home. But when does this strategy become counter-
productive? Do the anti-Japanese demonstrations of April 2005 prefigure
domestic instability Beijing will be unable to control? And so long as it is
“hugging the U.S. close” (Riddell 2003), why should Japan care? Still,
Article Nine revision, even of the cosmetic variety, will complicate Japan’s
relations with its neighbors.
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In sum, then, the constitutional stalemate over Article Nine is into its
sixth decade. In recent years, however, the battle lines of the debate have
shifted in ways that make major change
imaginable. Although this shift has neither
set the future course of change nor guaran-
teed its occurrence, it has increased the like-
lihood that the dispute over Article Nine
will break out of its long-standing political
bottleneck and finally allow the Japanese
people a say in its resolution. Whatever the outcome, we believe the
upcoming struggle will be an important, and hopefully affirmative, expe-
rience for Japan’s democracy. 
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Appendix
Partial Chronology of
Incremental Shifts in Policy
Guidelines and SDF
Capabilities: 1980–2005
1981: Prime Minister Suzuki announces Japan will defend SLOCs up to
1,000 nautical miles.
1983: Nakasone government relaxes arms export restrictions to allow
some technology transfers to the U.S.
1986: Nakasone government exceeds 1 percent of GNP ceiling for 1987
defense budget.
1991: Kaifu government deploys MSDF minesweepers to Persian Gulf
in aftermath of first Gulf War.
1992: Diet passes PKO Law (International Peace Cooperation Law)
allowing SDF participation in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations.
1995: Murayama government revises National Defense Program Outline
to reorient SDF to post-Cold War threats.
1997: SDF officers achieve improved access to Cabinet Office and
Ministers.
1998: Obuchi government relaxes ban on the military use of space by
announcing acquisition plans for surveillance satellites.
1998: Obuchi government approves bilateral research on missile defense
technologies with the U.S.
1999: Diet passes guideline laws allowing SDF to provide U.S. forces
rear area support in the event of a regional emergency involving
Japan’s security.
2000–2005: SDF acquisition plans improve force projection capabilities,
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including aerial refueling and assault ships with carrier decks.
2001: Administrative reforms increase centralization of civilian control in
the Prime Minister’s Office.
2001: MSDF establishes a Special Forces unit for boarding/disarming
ships.
2001: Diet passes Antiterrorism Law allowing the deployment of MSDF
ships to Indian Ocean in support of coalition forces conducting
operations in Afghanistan.
2001: Diet revises PKO Law relaxing use of weapons restrictions and
unfreezing provisions restricting SDF participation in peacekeep-
ing force (PKF) activities.
2002: Koizumi government deploys Aegis-equipped destroyer to Indian
Ocean under Antiterrorism Law.
2003: Diet passes Emergency Measures Laws.
2003: Diet passes Iraq Reconstruction Law.
2004: GOJ fully implements SDF deployment to Iraq under Iraq
Reconstruction Law.
2004: Diet approves measures to fund introduction of missile defense
system.
2004: Koizumi government issues National Defense Program Guideline
calling for new five-year buildup (2005–2010) of capabilities to
engage in counterterrorism, defense of Japan’s offshore islands, and
surveillance of territorial waters.
2004: GSDF establishes Rapid Response Unit.
2004: Koizumi government eases arms export restrictions to allow tech-
nological cooperation with the U.S. on missile defense.
2005: Koizumi government approves possible transfer of joint U.S.-
Japan developed missile defense system to third countries.
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